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ABSTRACT  
   
Climate change impacts are evident throughout the world, particularly in the low 
lying coastal areas. The multidimensional nature and cross-scale impacts of climate 
change require a concerted effort from different organizations operating at multiple levels 
of governance. The efficiency and effectiveness of the adaptation actions of these 
organizations rely on the problem framings, network structure, and power dynamics of 
the organizations and the challenges they encounter. Nevertheless, knowledge on how 
organizations within multi-level governance arrangements frame vulnerability, how the 
adaptation governance structure shapes their roles, how power dynamics affect the 
governance process, and how barriers emerge in adaptation governance as a result of 
multi-level interactions is limited. In this dissertation research, a multilevel governance 
perspective has been adopted to address these knowledge gaps through a case study of 
flood risk management in coastal Bangladesh. Key-informant interviews, systematic 
literature review, spatial multi-criteria decision analysis, social network analysis (SNA), 
and content analysis techniques have been used to collect and analyze data. This research 
finds that the organizations involved in adaptation governance generally have aligned 
framings of vulnerability, irrespective of the level at which they are operated, thus 
facilitating adaptation decision-making. However, this alignment raises concerns of a 
neglect of socio-economic aspects of vulnerability, potentially undermining adaptation 
initiatives. This study further finds that the adaptation governance process is elite-
pluralistic in nature, but has a coexistence of top-down and bottom-up processes in 
different phases of adaptation actions. The analysis of power dynamics discloses the 
dominance of a few national level organizations in the adaptation governance process in 
  ii 
Bangladesh. Lastly, four mechanisms have been found that can explain how 
organizational culture, practices, and preferences dictate the emergence of barriers in the 
adaptation governance process. This dissertation research overall advances our 
understanding on the significance of multilevel governance approach in climate change 
adaptation governance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Problem statement 
The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report projected 
that the climate change impacts would be more intense than previously expected in the 
low-lying coastal areas (Wong et al. 2013). Global mean sea level has risen 0.19 m in the 
last 110 years, resulting into submergence, coastal erosion, and coastal flooding (Rhein et 
al. 2013, Wong et al. 2013). The vulnerability of coastal areas are increasing because of 
high population growth, more economic activities, and urbanization in coastal areas 
(IPCC 2014). Climate change vulnerability is particularly evident in the coastal part of 
Bangladesh. Multidimensional climate change impacts, such as increased frequency of 
natural extreme events, salt water intrusion, sea level rise make Bangladesh one of the 10 
most climate affected countries in the world (Germanwatch 2019). Because of the  
potential for large scale damage as a result of climate change impacts, the management of 
coastal vulnerability requires participation of multiple organizations, in addition to small-
scale societal efforts. Globally, many of these organizations operate at different levels of 
jurisdictional scale (i.e. national, province, municipality) with different corresponding 
spatial scales of influence (i.e. national, regional, local) (Cash et al. 2006, Termeer et al. 
2010, Amundsen et al. 2010, Bauer et al. 2012). Through managing the adaptation 
actions that are designed to reduce vulnerability these organizations interact with each 
other, continuously or sporadically. Their understanding of vulnerability, the structure of 
governance arrangement, and nature of interactions can have significant impacts on the 
efficacy of adaptation. For instance, similar understandings of vulnerability has the 
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potential to increase the efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and legitimacy of adaptation 
management, but difference in understanding can cause economic wastage, resource 
misallocation, maladaptation, governance failures, and fragmented development 
(Wilbanks & Kates 1999, Gibson et al. 2000, O‘Brien et al. 2004, Adger et al. 2005, 
Eakin & Luers 2006, Pahl-Wostl 2009, Engle 2011). Similarly, highly centralized 
governance arrangements may prohibit experimental learning, trust building, 
collaborative management and disregard local priorities and context sensitivities (Ostrom 
2010, Jordan et al. 2015), on the other hand, it can facilitate better coordination and as a 
result prevent overlapping authorities, conflicting responsibilities, and duplicating 
functions (Termeer et al. 2010, Gillard et al. 2017).  
Some attempts have been made to evaluate how the understanding of 
vulnerability varies across scales (e.g. O‘Brien et al. 2004, Balica et al. 2009, Birkmann 
2007, Antwi-Agyei et al. 2017) and how actors‘ governance structure and interactions 
influence adaptation governance process (e.g. Keskitalo 2010, Bates et al. 2013, 
Fidelman et al. 2013, Verkerk et al. 2015), and the resulting challenges that might appear 
in the governance process (e.g. Amundsen et al. 2010, Juhola 2016). Despite these 
commendable contributions to the field of adaptation governance, we have limited 
understanding of a) how the multilevel organizations, operating at multiple levels of 
governance, understand vulnerability and what might explain coherence or difference in 
their framing; b) how power dynamics among actors influence the adaptation governance 
process, particularly in the context of Global South; and c) how and why challenges or 
barriers emerge in the adaptation governance process.    
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In response to these limitations, this research attempts to address these issues 
from a multilevel adaptation governance perspective (see section 1.2 for a conceptual 
background). This dissertation research is designed as three independent manuscripts, 
presented in chapter two, three and four, together responding to a broad research 
question: How does the understanding of climate change vulnerability by the different 
organizations involved in adaptation governance, and interactions among them to 
address that vulnerability through adaptation actions, ultimately affect the adaptation 
governance process? This overall research question is addressed by three sub-questions, 
each addressed separately in subsequent chapters, and each with multiple sub-questions:   
1. How do organizations, operating at different levels of governance and within 
different sectors of engagement, understand vulnerability to coastal flooding? 
a. What elements do these organizations prioritize as vulnerability 
determinants? 
b. What factors might explain any observed alignment or mismatch in their 
framings? 
2. How do the multilevel structure of governance arrangements and organizational 
interactions influence the adaptation governance process? 
a. How does the structure of the multilevel organizational network influence 
the adaptation governance process? 
b. How do power dynamics affect the planning, implementation, and 
monitoring phases of adaptation actions across the multilevel 
organizational network? 
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3. How do barriers emerge in adaptation governance? 
a. What are the mechanisms that can explain the emergence of barriers in the 
adaptation governance process in Bangladesh? 
I approach these questions pulling theories and concepts from multiple research 
areas, such as vulnerability, adaptation, and governance. I use different techniques that 
include key-informant interview, multi-criteria decision analysis, GIS, remote sensing, 
social network analysis, content analysis, to answer these research questions. The 
following section provides a brief overview of the theoretical and conceptual background 
I use in this dissertation research. For a detailed discussion on the use of these concepts 
and methods in answering the research questions, readers are requested to see chapter two 
through four.  
1.2. Conceptual Background 
1.2.1. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability, in this study, is defined as the degree or extent to which a 
system is likely to be exposed and sensitive to a hazard, and the capacity of that 
system to adapt to the effects of climate impacts (Watts and Bohle 1993, Cutter 
1996, Kasperson et al. 2005). Vulnerability has three subcomponents: exposure, 
sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. Exposure is the degree, duration, extent in 
which the system remains in contact with perturbations (Kasperson et al. 2005, 
Adger 2006). Sensitivity, on the other hand, is conceptualized variedly. 
Sensitivity is defined by Adger (2006) as ‗the extent to which a system can absorb 
impacts without suffering significant damage‘, while Gallopin (2006) defined 
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sensitivity as the degree to which a system is modified or affected by internal or 
external disturbances. Accentuating the climate factor, IPCC (2014) defined 
sensitivity as ‗the degree to which a system is adversely or beneficially affected 
by climate-related stimuli‘. Thus, the basic notion of sensitivity is the system‘s 
responsiveness to the internal or external perturbations it encounters. High 
sensitivity indicates higher responsiveness towards perturbations; in other words, 
higher probability of being affected. Exposure and sensitivity are oftentimes 
argued as inseparable (i.e. Luers 2005; Smit and Wandel 2006). This is because 
sensitivity and exposure are entangled with each other in such a way that the latter 
is the precondition of the former. Adaptive capacity, on the other hand, is the 
ability of the system and its components to adjust to potential damage, to take 
advantages of opportunities, or to response to consequences (IPCC 2014). 
Adaptive capacity modulates exposure and sensitivity through an inverse 
relationship. Higher adaptive capacity ensues lower exposure and sensitivity, and 
vice versa. Engle (2011) thinks that adaptive capacity is a desirable property or 
positive attribute of a system for reducing vulnerability. The resilience literature 
also depicts adaptive capacity as a desirable system property, but in somewhat 
different terminology (adaptability) (Engle 2011).  
Vulnerability of an area can be understood differently by different actors 
because of relative prioritization of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity 
determinants. This relative prioritization of vulnerability determinants indicates 
how vulnerability is conceived and evaluated. Such understanding of vulnerability 
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is also known as diagnostic framing in which the stakeholders are involved in the 
attribution and identification of key factors of vulnerability.   
In this dissertation research, we operationalize exposure, sensitivity, and 
adaptive capacity by selecting indicators from various secondary sources. While 
exposure indicators mostly represent the physical risk of the region, sensitivity 
indicators reflect the dependence of actors on hazard-sensitive activities and 
patterns of resource use. Adaptive capacity indicators measure the access to 
entitlements and resources that can be mobilized to cope with and adapt to 
climatic threats: health status, wealth, information access, resource stocks and 
access. Using these indicators I develop a composite index to analyze 
vulnerability framings by different actors. 
 
1.2.2. Adaptation 
The term ‗adaptation‘ can be traced back to Darwin‘s seminal work on 
evolutionary biology. It was later imported to human-environment studies with a 
little alteration in conceptual meaning. Currently, geographers perceive adaptation 
from social and ecological viewpoint with more emphasis on socio-economic, 
institutional, and organizational aspects. Adaptation definition in this research 
arena revolves around three questions posited by Smit et al. (2000): Adaptation to 
what? Who or what adapts? How does adaptation occur?. Answering these 
questions Smit & Wandel (2006, pp. 282) defined adaptation as the ―process, 
action or outcome in a system in order for the system to better cope with, manage 
or adjust to some changing condition, stress, hazard, risk or opportunity‖. This 
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definition of adaptation has evolved from vulnerability perspective and is 
relatively broad in scope. On the other hand, with greater emphasis on future 
conditions, Nelson et al. (2007, pp. 397) defined adaptation as ―the decision-
making process and the set of actions undertaken to maintain the capacity to deal 
with future change or perturbations to a social-ecological system without 
undergoing significant changes in function, structural identity, or feedbacks of 
that system while maintaining the option to develop.‖ This definition comes from 
a resilience point of view where the system essentially tries to maintain or look 
forward to satiability or less perturbations  the system. In this study, I construed 
adaptations as continuous, forward-looking strategies that are taken to manage or 
adjust to current and future perturbations. This definition allows me to consider 
the processes, actions, outcomes as well as future changing conditions.  
 
1.2.3. Multilevel governance 
Multilevel governance is built upon the context in which the governance 
authorities are dispersed across multiple jurisdictions. The concept has evolved 
from the early 1990s to capture the transformed governance structure and 
mechanisms of the European integration process and the eventual formation of the 
European Union. With the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 and the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1991, the integration process disseminated the power and 
authority away from national governments to the supranational European 
Community (later formed as European Union or EU) and to other regional actors 
(Hooghe 1996, Tortola 2017). These transformations brought about changes in the 
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EU polity that no longer could be explained or captured by the dominant theories 
of political integration: neofunctionalism
1
 and intergovernmentalism
2
 (Marks 
1992, 1993, Marks et al. 1996). Multilevel governance concept came into 
existence to capture this pluralistic and networked polity. 
The fundamental notion of this concept is decision making in a pluralistic 
and highly dispersed policy-making milieu where multiple actors participate at 
various political levels from supranational to sub-national or local (Stephenson 
2013). Multilevel governance directs threefold of authority displacement: upward 
to international actors, downward to local actors, and outward to private/civil 
actors (Pierre and Peters 2000). It implies that the actors are mutually dependent 
through intertwined cross-level decision making activities. Under a multilevel 
model, the increased competencies and the interconnectedness among the actors 
diminish, if not void, the ‗gate-keeper‘ role of national government and allow the 
subnational and/or non-central actors to open, or even remove, the center-
periphery gate (representativeness of peripheral actors in the central policy 
processes) and the domestic-foreign gate (representation of national or local 
interest in the international arena). The inclusions of NGOs, corporations, 
professional societies, and advocacy groups in the multi-actor network open up 
                                                 
1
 Developed in the late 1950s, the neofunctionalism theory primarily rests upon the ‗spillover‘ notion, 
meaning that integration or cooperation in one area creates the conditions or incentives for integration in 
another policy area. Neofunctionalism theory hypothesized that regional integration will be dominated by 
common needs and interests. 
2
 Characterized by state-centrism, intergovernmentalism postulates that national governments of the 
member states are the primary actors in the European integration process (Cini 2016). Establishment of a 
supranational body (i.e. EU) does not weaken the role of national governments rather it determines the 
national governments as the ultimate decision makers in the integration process. 
  9 
the state-society gate (prioritization of societal demand as national interest) 
(Piattoni 2010). 
Because of the involvement of different organizations in climate change 
adaptation in Bangladesh, in this study, I am using multilevel governance concept 
to examine the arrangement of organizations that are operating at multiple levels 
of governance and at different sectors of engagement. I am particularly focusing 
on government organizations and prominent non-government organizations. This 
concept enables me explain how power is distributed from national government to 
various levels of governance and how power differences are affecting the 
governance process. 
 
1.2.4. Power 
In this study, power is defined as the organizational and discursive 
capacity to achieve outcomes in social practices (Arts & Tatenhove 2004). 
Insights into the sources and dimensions of power can help evaluate the 
mechanisms of adaptation governance (Crona and Bodin 2010, Duit et al. 2010) 
and assess the performance of governance (Hayward & Lukes 2008). 
Understanding which actor is more powerful than others, and in what ways, can 
lead to improved policy and institutional design (Sherman & Ford 2014). 
The concept of power is long debated and its theorization and 
operationalization are essentially contested (Lukes 1974, Baldwin 2002, Avelino 
& Rotmas 2011, Boonstra 2016). In this paper, we adopted the conceptualization 
of power developed by Arts & van Tatenhove (2004) as an effective way to 
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analyze the power dynamics in multilevel adaptation governance where power 
can be observed in the interactions among actors, in actors‘ capacities, and in the 
structure of the multi-actor network. Building from earlier theorizations (i.e. 
Weber 1978, Gidden 1984, Clegg 1989), Arts & van Tatenhove (2004) converge 
the dichotomy of actor-centered and structure-centered conceptualizations of 
power.  Based on their conceptualization, we adopted two types of power: 
dispositional and structural to analyze our case. Dispositional power indicates 
actor‘s capacity to act using the resources it possesses and abiding by the 
institutional rules. This power can be invoked from material and ideational 
sources. Material sources primarily represent financial capacity and human 
resources, while ideational sources include knowledge, ideas, and information 
(Fuchs & Glaab 2011, Orsini 2013). Structural power is a macro-level 
phenomenon that shapes the nature and behavior of actors through order of 
significance, legitimization, legal means, and economic institutions, and can be 
characterized as authority. Authority can be defined as the perceived legitimized 
exercise of power by a certain actor to influence other actors or their interactions 
(Sikor & Lund 2009, Eriksen et al. 2015). For example, in a centralized regime, 
the structure of governance gives maximum authority to the central (i.e. national 
level) actors, enabling them to exercise power over other actors (Pahl-Wostl and 
Knieper 2014). Notably, dispositional and structural power can be intrinsically 
embroiled and, in an instance of interaction among actors, both of them can be 
wielded together. 
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1.3. Study area context 
Founded by the sedimentation of Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river system, the 
south-central coastal area of Bangladesh is less than 6 meter in elevation. 
Administratively, this region is divided into five districts: Barisal, Patuakhali, Barguna, 
Jhalkathi, and Pirojpur. Each of these districts is further divided into 32 sub-districts (Fig. 
1.1). With more than 8 million people, this 9000 km
2
 area regularly encounters climate 
induced extreme natural events such as monsoon flood, tropical cyclone, high tidal 
variation. This region suffers some of the more severe impacts of climatic extremes given 
that, unlike southwest or southeast coast, the south-central coast is highly exposed and 
not protected by mangrove forest or hills. Along with cyclones, flooding is also a 
recurrent phenomenon in this region. Two types of flooding usually occur in this region: 
river floods and tidal floods. River flooding happens during the monsoon and post-
monsoon period from river water overflowing, and the tidal flooding occurs when high 
tide or storm surge inundates large tracts of land. In order to protect the inhabitants of this 
region from cyclone and tidal inundation, in the 1960s-70s the government built 6000 km 
of embankments across the entire coastline. Inspired by the Dutch model of polders and 
with the support of multilateral development agencies, the coastal embankment project 
involved the construction of embankments along the river channels to enclose low-lying 
tracts of coast land. Among the 139 polders built across the coastline, 44 are located in 
this area. The establishment of the embankments brought a large tract of land, which was 
usually flooded during high tide, under agricultural activities (see Fig. 1.2). As a result, 
food production increased in the region and food security was enhanced to some extent. 
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Figure 1.1: Location of the study area 
Although the coastal embankments protected this area from some extreme events, 
it was still vulnerable to higher-intensity events. In 1991, the category-5 Cyclone 02-B 
caused 150,000 human deaths; a majority of them were from this region. The damage of 
this tropical cyclone convinced the government to invest in constructing cyclone shelters 
and developing an early-warning system. Currently, there are 2130 cyclone shelters along 
the entire coast and an effective early-warning system has been developed. While these 
efforts significantly reduced human death toll from subsequent events (Paul 2009), high 
vulnerability of the residents still persists. The empirical evidence suggest that the 
Bangladesh Meteorological Department cannot provide a reliable forecast beyond 12 
  13 
hours, and that there is considerable mistrust of warning messages among residents (Roy 
et al. 2015). The efficacy of the evacuation system is further impeded by religious 
superstitions and other socio-cultural reasons (Alam & Collins 2010, Garai 2017). 
Furthermore, the IPCC projects that by 2100 the coastal areas of Bangladesh will 
encounter at least 0.5m rise in mean sea level, resulting into 15-20% rise in tidal surges 
(Church et al. 2013). Such trends of rising sea levels can further cause overtopping of all 
polders in this study region by 2050 (Dasgupta et al. 2014). 
 
Figure 1.2: Standard embanked polders. The construction of polders brought large tracts 
of lands under agricultural production, and at the same time protected the residents from 
extreme natural events (source: author‘s sketch) 
In order to combat climate change impacts, different adaptation strategies have 
been undertaken in the study region. Some strategies are efforts by households or 
communities, such as homestead gardening, rainwater harvesting, shifting cropping 
patterns, and rice/prawn farming (Alam and Collins 2010, Arfanuzzaman et al. 2016, 
Garai 2017). Other adaptation efforts are large-scale, requiring the participation of 
organizations operating at multiple levels of jurisdiction. For example, the Bangladesh 
Rice Research Institute introduced salt-tolerant and flood-tolerant rice varieties that can 
endure moderate to strong soil salinity and withstand several days of inundation. On the 
other hand, the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) is responsible for 
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climate-resilient infrastructure projects and constructing multipurpose disaster shelters. 
Multiple organizations from different levels of jurisdictional scales are involved in these 
adaptation actions. International organizations like the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank are involved in adaptation decision-making process and in providing 
funds or loans, while national level organizations, such as the LGED or Ministry of 
Environment often act as the key adaptation implementation agencies. Adaptation 
implementation further includes involvement of district and/or more local level 
government or non-government organizations. Through collaboration and coordination, 
these organizations form a multilevel network of interactions.  
The governance of adaptation actions in Bangladesh is similar to traditional 
governance of development activities. Through formulating National Adaptation Plan of 
Action (NAPA) and Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP), 
Bangladesh government was able to mainstream climate change adaptation into 
development. The organizations that are involved in adaptation actions are the same 
organizations that work on development activities. Rahman & Tosun (2018) reported that 
the governance process of these organizations is highly influenced by the historical 
administration system of this region. The administration system of Indian subcontinent, 
that includes Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, has colonial inheritance and the colonial 
governance culture was characterized by a rigid, centralized, elite-centered, command-
control bureaucratic system. With the end of British colonialism in 1947, Bangladesh 
became a part of Pakistan and continued to have a similar governance approach: elite-
centered, top-down, and authoritarian.  In an effort to promote a more democratic and 
socialist government system, Bangladesh fought for its independence and gained it in 
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1971. However, the first few years were turbulent, characterized by several military 
coups, and no government stabilized. Bangladesh started a process of distributing power 
from the national government in 1980s with the empowerment of sub-district 
administrations, yet the governance approach was still rigid and centralized. Devolution 
of power accelerated after the first democratically-elected government came into power 
in 1991. The government started to formulate plans to set up priorities, mobilize 
organizations focusing on different sectors, and facilitate involvement of civil societies in 
the governance process. Particularly, in climate change management, the Bangladesh 
government involved various stakeholders to design actions plans.    
The involvement of multiple organizations in the management of adaptation 
actions makes Bangladesh an ideal case to examine my research questions. The climate 
change impacts that Bangladesh is facing are not novel; they can be found in any coastal 
area. Similarly, the way Bangladesh government mobilized its organizations in different 
sectors of engagement is also not uncommon. A sectoral focus of administration enables 
the government to emphasize specific aspects of society; thus governments from Global 
North and South seek to mobilize organizations in different sectors. Evidence across the 
world indicates that these organizations operate at multiple levels of governance, 
sometimes just two (i.e., national and local), and sometimes more than three (national, 
regional, state, and municipal).  In this way, an analysis of multilevel adaptation 
governance in Bangladesh may help understand the process of adaptation governance not 
just in the region but in other parts of the world where there are strong traditions of 
administrative centralization and sectoralization of decision-making.  
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1.4. Chapter overview 
This dissertation thesis is comprised of three chapters and a concluding chapter, in 
addition to this introduction chapter. These three chapters are written as individual 
research manuscripts with separate but related conceptual backgrounds and methods. 
They are framed in a way so that they can answer the three research questions that this 
dissertation seeks to answer. As a cohesive whole, these chapters provide us with insights 
on the framings of coastal vulnerability, management of adaptation actions, and 
governance barriers in a multilevel milieu.  
In the second chapter, I argued that the multidimensional impacts of climate 
change necessitate participation of large scale organizations in the management of 
vulnerability to climate change. Operating at multiple levels of governance, these 
organizations help manage the deleterious effects of changing climate for different 
sectors of human-environment systems. How they frame vulnerability, what influences 
their framings, why are their framings aligned or misaligned: While these are critical 
questions for managing vulnerability, they are often overlooked in the literature. By 
‗framing‘ I meant how actors understand and evaluate key factors of vulnerability. I 
analyzed how vulnerability is framed by the leading organizations across five sectors and 
three levels of governance. Evidence suggests that similarity in vulnerability framings of 
these organizations has the potential to increase the efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and 
legitimacy of vulnerability management, while significant misalignment can cause 
economic wastage, resource misallocation, maladaptation, governance failures, and 
fragmented development (Wilbanks & Kates 1999, Gibson et al. 2000, O‘Brien et al. 
2004, Adger et al. 2005, Eakin & Luers 2006, Pahl-Wostl 2009, Engle 2011). Drawing 
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from key-informant interviews, I developed a spatial multi-criteria decision analysis 
(MCDA) approach and identified vulnerability hotspots. With few variations, this chapter 
reveals that the framings of vulnerability are mostly aligned across scale irrespective of 
the scale at which stakeholders are operating. Collectively, proximity to river/sea along 
with poverty, schooling, cropping intensity, soil salinity, and availability of multipurpose 
disaster shelters are identified as key determinants of vulnerability by all organizations. 
They prioritize infrastructural and agricultural development as basis for vulnerability 
management. I argued that similarity of understanding of vulnerability across scales 
would facilitate adaptation decision-making process. However, the analysis revealed 
lesser focus on socio-economic criteria, which can undermine the success of adaptation 
initiatives. While the findings of this study can assist the decision-makers of Bangladesh 
in coastal vulnerability management, the methodological approach should be useful to 
assess coastal vulnerability in other parts of the world as well.   
The third chapter is built on the conceptual foundations of multilevel governance 
and power. I analyzed the structure and processes of and power dynamics in the 
multilevel governance of adaptation to flood. I adopted social network analysis approach 
and used the concept of power to examine the structure and processes of the multilevel 
adaptation governance network, and tested four hypotheses related to governance. The 
results revealed that the adaptation governance process is elite-pluralistic in nature, 
meaning that there is a coexistence of top-down and bottom-up processes in different 
phases of adaptation actions. I found that the organizations with highest influence over 
the governance process reside at the national level. I further identified five types of 
organizations based on the structural attributes of the governance network and their 
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functions. The analysis of power dynamics disclosed the dominance of a few 
organizations in the adaptation governance process in Bangladesh. I concluded with a 
discussion of the implications that might arise due to such relative centralization of 
power. 
The fourth chapter argues that existing barriers to adaptation studies mostly have 
attempted to create an exhaustive list of barriers by focusing on ‗what‘ question (what 
barriers exist?), while we continue to have a meager understanding on ‗how‘ or ‗why‘ 
barriers emerge in the governance process. In this chapter, I take an effort to explain the 
mechanisms that causes the emergence of barriers in the climate change governance 
process. I adopted key-informant interviews and evidence synthesis techniques to identify 
how the barriers emerge in the adaptation governance process in flood management 
sector. My analysis revealed that there are at least eight mechanisms that are involved in 
the emergence of barriers: frame polarization, lost in translation, power dynamics 
(enclosure/exclusion), power dynamics (boundary control), conflict infection, risk 
innovation, organizational inertia, and belief formation. This mechanism-based analysis 
of barriers will help to address and navigate through the barriers more effectively to 
ascertain successful adaptation. Chapter five discusses the key findings derived from this 
dissertation research and in what areas research can be furthered. 
 
1.5. Significance 
Climate change impacts affect the coastal low lying areas vigorously. These 
impacts do not just jeopardize the livelihood of coastal people; their very existence is 
under threat. To sustain secure livelihoods in the coastal vulnerable areas, concerted 
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efforts from different actors are indispensable. In these efforts to plan and manage 
adaptation actions, these actors interact with each other. The premise of my dissertation is 
that a better understanding of different issues entailed in these interactions will result into 
a better management of adaptation actions. In that regard, this dissertation research 
contributes to the existing adaptation governance research in at least three ways. First, it 
advances our understanding on the multiple perspectives of perceiving vulnerability by 
revealing how multilevel organizations frame vulnerability. Analysis of multiple 
perspective of vulnerability is important because a similarity in understanding of a 
problem may result into more effective and efficient management while divergence in 
understanding can cause conflict, tension, contestation among actors and thus impede the 
governance process. This research further contributes to the methodological aspect of 
vulnerability research by developing a composite vulnerability index based spatial multi-
criteria decision analysis technique. Second, it enhances our knowledge on how power 
dynamics among these organizations influence the adaptation governance process. 
Studies on power dynamics are crucial in order to understand the governance approach 
and its effects on the outcome of interest – i.e., adaptation. It will assist us to realize 
which actors need to be more empowered to facilitate the governance process and how 
power relations among governing agencies can influence adaptation outcomes. To 
understand the influence of power dynamics in adaptation governance in Bangladesh, this 
research introduces a novel social network analysis approach to identify the influence of 
different organizations in the adaptation governance process based on their collaboration 
and cooperation networks. Third, this research enables us to look beyond the list of 
barriers to adaptation governance by identifying underlying social mechanisms of why 
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and how barriers emerge. Mechanism-based explanation of barriers is a relatively new 
approach of analysis in climate change adaptation. This approach assists us in capturing 
the processes through which barriers emerge in the governance process. Mechanism-
based analysis is important because it allows us to address the causes of the problem (i.e. 
barriers).     
This research draws theories from geography, disaster studies, political science, 
sociology, public administration, and sustainability science. In this way, it is an 
interdisciplinary research project and will be useful to all disciplines that are concerned 
of climate change research. Also, the methodological approach that has been used in this 
research can be replicated to identify the vulnerable hotspots, to examine the influence of 
organizations over adaptation governance, and to analyze the underlying mechanisms of 
barriers in other climate vulnerable areas.  The findings of this research will be beneficial 
to the decision-makers of Bangladesh as they will be able to recognize the role of power 
dynamics in adaptation governance and the underlying mechanisms of governance 
barriers. Addressing the power dynamics and mechanisms of barriers, they can make the 
adaptation governance more efficient and effective. This research will further assist the 
international development aid agencies, such as USAID, World Bank, to formulate better 
adaptation plans for coastal vulnerable areas in Bangladesh. 
Whether development and adaptation should be treated same or differently is 
arguable, but in Bangladesh adaptation and development are conceived in a similar vein. 
The only difference between these two is that in case of adaptation these organizations 
consider the impacts of long-term climate change. Because of the mainstreaming of 
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climate adaptation into development, adaptation becomes prone to be affected by the 
same governance challenges that a regular development initiative encounters.  
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CHAPTER 2 
EXAMINATION OF COASTAL VULNERABILITY FRAMINGS AT MULTIPLE 
LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE 
2.1. Introduction 
Operating at different levels of governance (e.g. national, regional, local), 
governmental and non-governmental organizations manage vulnerability to climate 
change by undertaking or enabling adaptation actions (Pahl-Wostl 2009, Keskitalo 2010, 
Termeer et al. 2010). The different ways that such organizations frame vulnerability – in 
other words, how they understand and evaluate vulnerability – are likely to affect how 
they interact in their efforts to ensure successful management of vulnerability across 
scales (Adger et al. 2005, O‘Brien et al. 2004). Similarity in vulnerability framings of 
these organizations has the potential to increase the efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and 
legitimacy of vulnerability management, while significant misalignment can cause 
economic wastage, resource misallocation, maladaptation, governance failures, and 
fragmented development (Wilbanks & Kates 1999, Gibson et al. 2000, O‘Brien et al. 
2004, Adger et al. 2005, Eakin & Luers 2006, Pahl-Wostl 2009, Engle 2011). Similarity 
in framing can also ensure that diverse agencies pinpoint the same vulnerable areas and 
thus facilitate coordinated management. Contrarily, a misalignment in framing may 
suggest there is no agreement in what constitutes vulnerable areas, baffling decision-
makers. By analyzing vulnerability framings, researchers can shed light on which criteria 
have been prioritized by what agencies and why, and thus which sector of engagement 
needs particular attention in future adaptation policy making.  
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 ‗Vulnerability‘, in this study, is defined as the degree or extent to which a system 
is likely to be exposed and sensitive to a hazard, and the capacity of that system to adapt 
to the effects of climate impacts (Watts and Bohle 1993, Cutter 1996, Kasperson et al. 
2005). By ‗organization,‘ I refer to a set of actors and institutional arrangements with a 
common set of objectives, and who must interact across multiple action situations at 
different levels of activity (Polski & Ostrom 2015). Formally, I define ‗framing‘ as how 
an actor or an organization understands the structure and boundary of a system and 
prioritizes its functions (Leach et al. 2010). Despite significant discussion on the 
importance of analyzing vulnerability framings at different levels of governance, little 
effort has been made to date to capture such framings by actors engaged in managing 
vulnerability (e.g. Reidsma et al. 2009, Fekete et al. 2010, Carmenta et al. 2017). In this 
paper, I present an analysis of how different organizations, at different levels of 
government, frame vulnerability in the context of coastal areas in Bangladesh. I adopted 
the diagnostic framing approach (Snow & Benford 1988) in which the stakeholders are 
involved in the identification and attribution of key factors of vulnerability.   
Located only a few meters above mean sea level, the south-central coastal 
Bangladesh is experiencing the adverse impacts of climate change in the form of 
recurrent flooding, increased frequency of tropical cyclones, higher tidal surges, wider 
tidal fluctuations, and penetration of salt water inland. Downscaled analyses of climate 
impacts indicate that a large part of this area will likely to be flooded by next three 
decades due to the changing climate (Karim & Mimura 2008, Bhuiyan & Dutta 2012, 
Dasgupta et al. 2014). The potential negative consequences of flooding have persuaded 
the government of Bangladesh to adopt an inclusive approach in order to manage 
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vulnerabilities in the coastal systems. The government has distributed the responsibility 
for climate change response across multiple organizations with mandates of different 
scopes, and has fostered the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
reducing climate change vulnerability. These organizations operate at different levels of 
governance with variable authority. As such, the national government has taken a 
multilevel governance approach by ensuring participation of a range of organizations 
operating at different levels of jurisdictional and/or corresponding spatial scale in 
formulating and implementing activities to reduce vulnerability. Following Termeer et al. 
(2010), I define ‗multilevel governance‘ as the decision-making and decision 
implementation that involves multiple actors at multiple levels of governance and that 
takes place across multiple jurisdictions and sectors. In this multilevel governance 
context, I would expect that if the organizations involved have similar framings of 
vulnerability, they would have similar priorities for action and make decisions in a 
synergistic and complementary fashion. However, this assumption may not always hold 
true.  
Multilevel vulnerability management has primarily been analyzed in two ways: 
multilevel interactions and multilevel assessment. Studies of multilevel interactions are 
concerned with exploring the interactions among stakeholders operating at different 
levels of governance. Such interactions, often of two types- vertical and horizontal-- can 
subdue the consequences of scale mismatch, multiple interpretation, and vulnerability 
tradeoffs (Young 2002, Cash et al. 2006, Janssen & Anderies 2007). The empirical 
evidence suggests that multilevel interactions are highly contextualized in nature and 
influenced by the governance system. For instance, a centralized system in England 
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develops well-integrated and efficient vertical and horizontal interactions among the 
organizations involved in vulnerability management (Keskitalo 2010), while under a 
similar centralized system in Senegal, limited vertical coordination undermines the local 
level efforts to address vulnerability (Vedeld et al. 2016). On the other hand, multilevel 
vulnerability assessments are concerned with representing the differential manifestation 
of vulnerability across spatial scales. These assessments mostly focus on units of analysis 
at different levels of spatial scales. The determinants of vulnerability may be treated 
equally at all scales, or analyses may adopt expert judgment to weigh determinants 
differently according to different processes at play across various decision levels. 
O‘Brien et al. (2004), Fekete et al. (2010) and Mclaughlin & Cooper (2010) argued that 
important local variations are masked by simplification at national scale and thus 
analyses need to be conducted at all possible levels before an adaptation decision is 
made. The selection of determinants is contentious; some scholars support using the same 
vulnerability determinants irrespective of scale it is being analyzed (e.g. O‘Brien et al. 
2004, Balica et al. 2009), while others found that the determinants vary across different 
levels with implications for investment and development (e.g. Birkmann 2007, Antwi-
Agyei et al. 2017). Overall, these efforts explore the linkages among organizations and 
other stakeholders at multiple levels of governance and capture the vulnerability 
manifestation across spatial scale. Yet, the questions of how the multilevel organizations 
frame vulnerability and why there is a coherence or difference in their framing are still 
under-researched.  
   In order to address the climate change vulnerability more effectively, the 
government of Bangladesh formulated the National Adaptation Program of Action 
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(NAPA), Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP), and National 
Plan for Disaster Management (NPDM). In their effort to implement the NAPA, the 
government focuses on six sectors of engagement: agriculture, forestry, water, livelihood, 
industry and infrastructure, and policy and institutions (NAPA 2009). Although around 
40 ministries and their associated departments and autonomous organizations are working 
in these sectors to reduce climate induced vulnerability, there are only a few 
organizations and agencies with key roles in implementation of an action plan. For 
instance, in the hydrology or water resources sector, four organizations are actively 
engaged under the Ministry of Water Resources, and among them Bangladesh Water 
Development Board is the dominant organization in terms of resources, work scope, and 
influence (see Table 1). Furthermore, along with the government organizations, non-
government organizations (NGOs) play active roles in vulnerability reduction efforts, 
particularly in socio-economic sectors (Khan & Rahman 2007, Islam & Walkerden 
2015). These organizations are mostly hierarchical and follow jurisdictional scale (i.e. 
national, division, district, sub-district) in governance (Rahman & Tosun 2018). In the 
development of climate policies, plans, and actions they actively contribute through 
baseline information collection, vulnerability assessments, synthesis of information, and 
decision making (Shaw et al. 2013).  
To date, there have been a few efforts to understand the role of organizations in 
climate vulnerability management in coastal Bangladesh (e.g. Matin & Taher 2001, 
Thomalla et al. 2005, Khan & Rahman 2007, Ikeda 2009, Islam & Walkerden 2015). 
Focusing mostly on NGOs, these studies indicated that NGOs play crucial roles in the 
reduction of natural disaster vulnerability through various social and economic activities 
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but often criticized for concentrating more on short-term emergency events for financial 
benefits and ignore long-term vulnerability reduction measures. Despite these studies, it 
is less-understood that how the government and non-government organizations frame 
vulnerability or what influences their framings. Alignment in framings would potentially 
limit the resource wastage, avoid episodic development initiatives, and assist in 
coordinating investment decisions, and adaptation planning; the misalignment would do 
otherwise.  
This lacuna in the research leads us to ask the following questions: How do 
sectoral organizations operating at different levels of governance frame vulnerability? 
What elements do such organizations prioritize as vulnerability determinants? What 
factors might explain any observed alignment or mismatch in their framings? I tackle 
these questions by conducting a primary research on the major actors across sectors (i.e. 
hydrological, infrastructural, agricultural, forestry, socioeconomic) and levels of 
governance (i.e. national, district, sub-district). I select the leading government 
organizations in hydrology, infrastructure, agriculture, and forestry sector which are 
involved in the vulnerability management in the south-central coastal region of 
Bangladesh as major actors (see Appendix A). Because of their active participation in 
vulnerability management, I also included the leading NGOs, who primarily attend the 
socio-economic sectors. Most of these NGOs work at two levels: national and local. I 
identified ‗leading‘ organizations on the basis of the scope of work, resources, funding, 
and reputation. I develop an indicator-based composite vulnerability index and identified 
vulnerability hotspots using a spatial multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) approach- 
an approach that is concerned with solving spatial decision and planning problems 
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involving multiple criteria, for each of the leading organizations at each level of 
governance. Because vulnerability hotspots are those areas where there is strong 
agreement over vulnerability, their identification can assist the decision makers in 
narrowing resource investment and preventing wastage. Lack of coincidence in the 
prioritization of vulnerable areas among the organizations would indicate a lack of 
underlying agreement on the determinants of vulnerability and potentially a need for 
further investigation on the source of such disagreement. 
 
2.2. Study Area 
The south-central coast of Bangladesh is home to more than eight million people. 
This 9000 km
2
 area is divided into five contiguous districts and 32 sub-districts (Fig. 1.1). 
In this paper, I consider sub-district as unit of analysis because of the data availability at 
that scale, and to better capture dynamics of vulnerability. The area regularly encounters 
climate-induced events such as floods, tropical cyclones, and high tidal variation. Unlike 
southwest or southeast coastal plain, the south-central coast is not protected by mangrove 
forest or hills, and hence is exposed to extreme events. Two types of floods usually occur 
in this region: river floods and tidal floods. River floods occur during monsoon and post-
monsoon period due to spilling of river waters. The tidal floods occur when high tide or 
surge inundates large tract of lands. Following the Dutch model of polders, the 
government built 44 polders (embanked low lying areas) during 1960s–1970s to protect 
the inhabitants from cyclone and tidal surge and to ensure food security by expanding 
agricultural lands. However, the system is still vulnerable to higher-intensity floods and 
cyclones due to embankment debility, and the population‘s mistrust in warning signs, fear 
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of household larceny (affecting their willingness to evacuate), and obliviousness to the 
impacts of previous events (Saari & Rahman 2003, Roy et al. 2015, Garai 2017, Ishtiaque 
et al. 2017). Dasgupta et al. (2014) found that under the changing climate this region will 
encounter approximately 27 cm rise in sea level per year and as a result all the polders 
will be overtopped by 2050 unless the government invests more than $800 million to 
heighten the embankments. Furthermore, they estimated that the damage of the tropical 
cyclones would be more intense, potentially costing more than $2 billion by 2050. 
 
2.3. Materials and Methods 
In order to examine the coastal vulnerability framings by the leading 
organizations operating at different sectors of engagement and levels of governance, I 
followed several steps. First, I developed an indicator-based composite vulnerability 
index by consulting with key-informants from the leading organizations and by putting 
relative weights to the indicators using MCDA approach (i.e. analytical network process). 
Second, I mapped the results of each organization‘s framing of vulnerability, and 
identified the vulnerability hotspots for each of the leading organizations and for each 
level of governance. Third, I analyzed the variation in the relative importance of specific 
vulnerability criteria across the leading organizations. This three step approach can be 
used to assess coastal vulnerability in any part of the world and thus serve as a 
generalizable approach to elicit the framings of distinct organizations that are involved in 
collaborative adaptation governance in a specific coastal area. It is important to note that 
this methodological approach requires a large set of proxy indicators for vulnerability, 
extensive interviews with decision-makers, and unbiased identification of vulnerable 
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areas. As such, availability of data, access to decision-makers, and caution for interviewer 
biasness would be imperative to adopt this approach. 
 
2.3.1. Development of vulnerability index 
2.3.1.1. Vulnerability indicators  
Indicator-based vulnerability assessment requires the selection of 
proxy variables for biophysical and socio-economic components (Cutter et 
al. 2003) thought to represent the three core aspects of vulnerability of a 
system: exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Eakin & Bojórquez-
Tapia 2008). Exposure indicators mostly represent the physical risk of the 
region. Sensitivity indicators reflect the dependence of actors on hazard-
sensitive activities and patterns of resource use. Adaptive capacity 
indicators measure the access to entitlements and resources that can be 
mobilized to cope with and adapt to climatic threats: health status, wealth, 
information access, resource stocks and access. Note that interpretations of 
these indicators are context specific. For instance, Gerlitz et al. (2017) 
found that indebtedness in Hindu-Kush Himalayan region increases the 
sensitivity through intensifying the financial tension during times of 
emergencies. Lemos et al. (2016), however, argued that access to loans in 
Northeast Brazil increases adaptive capacity. As such, the indicators need 
to be interpreted in the context of study area (in this case, coastal 
Bangladesh) and informed by prior research that associates system 
variables to vulnerability outcomes in the area.  
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Based on a literature review, I identified 27 indicators of 
vulnerability and categorized them under seven major dimensions. These 
indicators have been widely used in vulnerability research as proxy 
variables for determining vulnerability. They served as first-level criteria 
for structuring the vulnerability assessment: social, economic, natural, 
agriculture, land use, infrastructure, and household characteristics (see 
Appendix 1). Data for each sub-criterion (or indicator), collected from 
census reports and district statistics, was aggregated at the sub-district 
level.  
 
2.3.1.2. Data Standardization 
There are several ways for data standardization (see Yoon 2012, 
Nguyen et al. 2016). I used a min-max rescaling transformation to 
transform the diverse measurement scales and units of the sub-criteria into 
a uniform measurement scale with a range between zero and one (Cutter et 
al. 2010, Yoon 2012, Ahsan & Warner 2014). In this study, if the higher 
value of a sub-criterion represents higher vulnerability (e.g. poverty rate), 
the standardization was been done as following:  
    {
                                                                       
       
          
                                                   
                                                                 
 
On the other hand, if the lower value of a sub-criterion represents 
higher vulnerability (e.g. elevation), it is standardized as follows: 
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    {
                                                                       
       
          
                                                   
                                                                 
 
 
2.3.1.3. Key-informant interviews  
 I conducted key-informant interviews in the three offices (i.e. 
national, district, and sub-district office) of each leading government 
organization and two offices (i.e. national, local) of two NGOs: BRAC 
and Sangram. I prepared a semi-structured questionnaire and interviewed 
25 key informants who had substantial knowledge on that organization‘s 
activities and held enough authority to comment as a representative of that 
organization.  Interviews lasted approximately an hour, in which the 
interviewees provided a detailed description of their organizational 
activities as well as evaluated specific vulnerability criteria as part of a 
process of eliciting their vulnerability framings. The relative importance of 
the pre-identified vulnerability criteria for the interviewee was interpreted 
as an indication of how they framed primary factors influencing on 
vulnerability in the region. Each interviewee was asked to create a 
network structure: a structure that related specific vulnerability criterion to 
other criterion within an overall structure that presented vulnerability as a 
product of a series of first-level criteria (i.e., social, economic, natural, 
agriculture, land use, infrastructure, and household characteristics) (Fig. 
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2.1). I made sure that the creation of network structure was not influenced 
by interviewer bias.  
 
Figure 2.1: A network structure of vulnerability criteria created by the 
district level DAE official. Each interviewee created a separate network 
structure based on their prior knowledge and experience. 
 
Later, the interviewees perform a pairwise comparison of first-
level criteria using Saaty‘s scale (Saaty 1987) (Table 2.1). This process 
involves each interviewee deciding which of two criteria (e.g., ―social‖ vs. 
―economic‖) is more important as a vulnerability determinant, and then 
how much more important. To reduce interviewee fatigue, I limited the 
pairwise comparisons to the first-level criteria, and instead asked them to 
ordinally rank the sub criteria within each first-level category (e.g., rank 
the sub criteria related to ―social‖ and then the sub-criteria related to 
―natural‖ etc.). The sub-criteria ranking was done following an ascending 
order of significance in determining vulnerability (Bausch et al. 2014). 
Note that, the interview could be long and exhaustive for the interviewees 
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if they have to create the network structure or do the pairwise comparison 
alone. Interviewer should provide a succinct detail of how the network 
structure functions toward vulnerability and may guide the interviewee in 
the process of network structure creation and pairwise comparison, but at 
the same time the interviewer needs to ensure that the process is devoid of 
interviewer-biasness.   
 
2.3.1.4. Analytical Network Process (ANP) 
The criteria weighting for each office of the organizations was 
determined using the ANP process. Once the pairwise comparison was 
completed, the priority weight vector was computed using Superdecision 
software (Liu et al. 2003). To be acceptable, the weighting of all criteria 
needed to obtain a consistency ratio of less than 0.1 (Saaty 1990). The 
criteria were put into a supermatrix- a form of partitioned matrix 
comprising of several block matrices, to represent their interrelationships. 
Each block matrix contained the priority weight vectors of the elements 
and represents the influence (or importance) of the elements over one 
another. Later, this initial supermatrix was modified to a weighted 
supermatrix so that each of the columns sums to unity (Fig. 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2: A general form of supermatrix. Here, C represents components 
(or criteria), e represents element (or sub-criteria), and W represents 
relative weights obtained through pairwise comparison. 
 
However, as all the criteria are part of a network, a criterion can 
indirectly influence a third criterion through a second criterion. To capture 
this transmission of influence along all possible paths of supermatrix, a 
limit matrix is required. The limit matrix was processed by raising the 
entire supermatrix to powers until convergence so that all columns are 
identical. The limit matrix provides the final weight to the criteria and the 
sum of all the criteria is one. 
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Table 2.1: Scale of relative importance (Saaty 1990) 
Intensity of 
importance 
Definition Explanation 
1 Equal importance Two criteria contributes equally 
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgment slightly 
favor one over another 
5 Strong importance Experience and judgment strongly 
favor one over another 
7 Very strong 
importance 
Activity is strongly favored and its 
dominance is demonstrated in 
practice 
9 Extreme importance Importance of one over another 
affirmed on the highest possible 
order 
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values Used to represent compromise 
between the priorities listed above 
 
2.3.1.5. Sub-criteria weights 
During the interview process the interviewees were asked to rank 
the sub-criteria based on their importance in evaluating vulnerability. The 
rank scale was in ascending order meaning 1 is the most important, 2 is 
the second most importance, and so on. However, this ordinal scale for 
sub-criteria weights cannot be directly compared to the criteria weights 
without transformation (Bausch et al. 2014). In this study, using rank-
order centroid method the ordinal scale is transformed to weights (wi) in a 
scale with ratio properties (Noh & Lee 2003): 
    
 
 
 ∑
 
 
 
   
                                
where, i is the index variable, n is the number of variables, k is the rank of 
variable determined by the interviewee. After calculating the weights for 
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all sub-criteria, the weights were normalized with respect to the criteria 
weights. To illustrate, hydrological organization gave the weight of 0.225 
to the agricultural criterion. The weights of the agricultural sub-criteria 
were then standardized, so that the sum of the sub-criteria weights equaled 
to the criteria weight (0.225).  
 
2.3.2. Vulnerability mapping and hotspots 
2.3.2.1 Vulnerability score and categories 
Once the data were standardized and relative weights of sub-
criteria were determined, the final vulnerability score for each location 
was calculated as: 
    ∑    
 
   
                         
where, Vi is the final vulnerability score, si  is the standardized data score, 
and wi is the sub-criteria weights. Based on the Equation 2 vulnerability 
ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 represents the least vulnerability and 1 denotes 
the most vulnerable. After calculating vulnerability for all sub-districts, a 
vulnerability map was produced for each organization and for each level. 
The final vulnerability index was divided into five categories:{VL (very 
low), L (low), M (moderate), H (high), VH (very high)} based on Weber-
Fechner Law (Bojórquez-Tapia et al. 2009). The Weber-Fechner Law 
states that perception is proportional to increase of stimulus which is 
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noticeable only when it increases by a constant percentage, known as ‗just 
noticeable difference‘ (For details, see Bojórquez-Tapia et al. 2009). 
In this study, the category cuts,   , are computed with respect to 
the best state or the lowest vulnerability score,   : 
            
      
where, v is the category cut value as VL equals to 1, L equals to 2, and so 
on;    represents the best state of stimulus; (1 + r) is the progression 
factor representing the relationship between the stimulus and perceived 
intensity;    is the initial stimulus representing the smallest detectable 
level of a stimulus and can be calculated as follows: 
    
  
      
 
where, n  is the number of vulnerability categories;    is the difference 
between the best and worst state of the stimulus. For each category cut, I 
tested different progression factors ranging from 1 to 2, and found 1.25 
progression factor as the most suitable for this analysis (For details, see 
Bojórquez-Tapia et al. 2009). I suggest trialing different progression 
factors and further consulting with the interviewees to obtain a specific 
progression factor. If multiple progression factors are selected by the 
interviewees, arithmetic mean could be considered for analysis. 
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2.3.2.2. Vulnerability hotspot identification 
To analyze the vulnerability hotspots, both global and local clustering 
techniques were employed. I relied on two indices of spatial clustering. 
Global spatial autocorrelation was assessed using Moran‘s I. Ranging 
from -1 to +1, this index indicates spatial dispersion (-1) or aggregation 
(+1). On the other hand, the local clustering was identified using Getis-
Ord Gi* (Getis & Ord 1992) to determine local hotspot. The spatial weight 
was based on a queen case contiguity rule-based spatial weight matrix for 
both indices. 
 
2.3.3. Analysis of variation in criteria weighting 
In order to analyze the variation of criteria weightings among the 
organizations, determined using the information from the key-informant interview 
and ANP processes, I adopted one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVA 
reveals statistically significant differences between the means of two or more 
independent groups or samples. I conducted the ANOVA test and associated post-
hoc test for each organization type and level of governance. 
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Figure 2.3: Workflow diagram of vulnerability analysis. 
 
2.4. Results 
The coastal vulnerability maps indicate significant homogeneity in the framings 
of vulnerability by the different organizations, though some variations can be observed 
(Fig. 4). It is the result of weighting of different criteria by the key respondents (Fig. 5). 
Collectively, the representatives of the different organizations concur that the eastern part 
of the study area is highly vulnerable while the central part is the least vulnerable (Fig. 6). 
According to our analysis, vulnerability of Muladi, Mehendiganj, Gaurnodi, Babuganj, 
Hizla, and Barisal Sadar sub-districts (under Barisal district), in the northeast part, is 
considered particularly high given their proximity to the Meghna River (E), greater 
number of earthen houses (S), high poverty rate (S), low amount of net cultivated and 
vegetated area (S), lack of irrigation facilities (AC), and existence of fewer flood shelters 
(AC). Some organizations‘ framings also identified the southeastern sub-districts as 
highly vulnerable. In particular, Galachipa and Bauphal sub-districts (under Patuakhali) 
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are relatively more vulnerable because of their low elevation (E), adjacency to the Tetulia 
River and the Bay of Bengal (E), a high number of earthen houses with no electricity (S, 
AC), and less net cultivated area with high soil salinity (S, AC). In all of their framings, 
organization representatives designated the least vulnerable areas as the Betagi, Barguna 
Sadar (under Barguna districts), Kathalia (under Jhalokati districts), and Mirzaganj sub-
districts (under Patuakhali districts). This designation resulted from relatively greater 
distance from major rivers and the sea (E), a low poverty rate (S), a greater number of 
schools and colleges (AC), high cropping intensity (AC), and low soil salinity (AC). 
Geographically, the entire western part of study area is classified as moderate to low 
vulnerable to flood as it is located away from large water bodies. However, Zianagar sub-
district (under Pirojpur) depicts high vulnerability compared to its adjacent areas because 
of significantly low literacy rate (AC), few flood shelters and educational institutions 
(AC), lack of fertile soil and farming equipment (S, AC), and proximity to the Balaswar 
River (E). Overall, poverty, education, means of livelihoods, household structure, and 
proximity to rivers or sea are playing key roles in determining vulnerability in the 
framings of all the organizations consulted.    
Although the vulnerability framings of the leading organizations are mostly 
aligned, they contain some variations. Particularly, the framing of NGOs differs 
significantly with most of the government organizations. In the following sections, I 
discuss how vulnerability framings vary across the levels of governance and sectors 
based on each criterion. Note that the differences in prioritization for each criterion do 
not explicitly represent discrepancies in the overall vulnerability framings of these 
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organizations, rather, it is the combinations of weighting of criteria and sub-criteria that 
determine the overall framing. 
2.4.1. Determinants of Vulnerability  
2.4.1.1. Infrastructure 
The studied organizations acknowledge the significance of 
infrastructure in this hazard prone area and recommended that 
infrastructure should remain as one of the topmost priorities in future 
planning and policy formulation. They consider that both flood shelters 
and educational institutions are important during floods. Construction of 
schools and colleges in flood prone areas, while at first may seem 
counterintuitive and perhaps maladaptive (by increasing exposure of key 
services to flooding), in practice can serve two purposes: the provision of 
education (enhancing capacity over long-term) and supporting evacuees 
during emergency (reducing exposure at times of flood). While these 
institutions are customarily built by LGED, other organizations recognized 
the importance of such infrastructure in managing flood-induced 
vulnerability. The representative of the sub-district-level of DAE, for 
example, comments that without embankments agriculture would be 
nearly impossible in this region because of high soil salinity and tidal 
fluctuations, and thus weighted infrastructure higher than agriculture. As 
such, the ANOVA test did not find any significant differences between the 
infrastructural criteria weights by BWDB, LGED, DAE, and FD (Table 
2.2).  
  43 
However, the NGOs‘ prioritization differs significantly with 
several organizations, as they think disaster shelters are certainly required 
but that ―social awareness‖ of disasters should also receive priority. They 
found that in many instances the local people are reluctant to take refuge 
in disaster shelters because of the mistrust in early warnings and notices, 
fear of theft of their belongings and loss of memory of the impacts of 
previous events (Garai 2017, Ishtiaque et al. 2017). For instance, in our 
study area, during cyclone Mora, Bangladesh Meteorological Department 
raised the warning signal to 8 (great danger) in fear of strong winds and 
storm surge, but the cyclone made landfall in south-eastern Bangladesh 
and part of Myanmar, leaving the study area unaffected. The NGOs said, 
the ‗government wanted us to help evacuate the vulnerable people under 
the warning signal 8, but the local people laughed at and ignore the 
evacuation process indicating the clear and sunny sky.‘ This is further 
complicated by the narrative of the NGOs, who point that the study area 
already has a good number of educational institutions that can serve as 
disaster shelters and the emphasis should be on disaster awareness among 
local people. Overall, the organizations agreed that infrastructure is a key 
criterion for coastal vulnerability management but the NGOs additionally 
stressed on the inclusion of social aspects, capacity building, to 
infrastructural solutions.   
        
  44 
Table 2.2: Differences in mean value between organizations in terms of 
infrastructural criteria weighting 
Organizations BWDB LGED DAE FD NGOs 
BWDB  0.007 0.017 0.033 0.080** 
LGED   0.010 0.027 0.073* 
DAE    0.017 0.063* 
FD     0.047 
ANOVA Diagnostic F-statistics: 6.554** 
Significance p-value: ‗***‘<0.001, ‗**‘<0.01, ‗*‘<0.05 
 
2.4.1.2. Agriculture 
Agricultural criteria are also ranked high by most of the 
organizations, possibly reflecting the extreme vulnerability of net 
cultivated area, intensely cropped areas, and irrigation facilities to floods. 
Most of the organizations working in the rural area prioritize sustaining 
agriculture in their long-term planning as agriculture encompasses a major 
source of livelihoods. Historically, safeguarding and expanding the 
agricultural lands was one of the major objectives of BWDB and DAE. In 
all level of governance, these two organizations emphasized the 
importance of agriculture as source of livelihoods. Furthermore, despite 
their operational differences, the national and district level offices of 
LGED and FD acknowledged the importance of agricultural criteria. The 
LGED official commented, ‗you will find agricultural lands almost 
everywhere in this region. Before hitting the settlements, floods damage 
the agricultural lands, and destroy the economic base of the agricultural 
households, and thus make them vulnerable.‘ However, the national and 
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sub-district level FD, sub-district level LGED, and the NGOs conceded 
that although rural economy mostly relies on agriculture, the overall 
economy should be prioritized. More than 55% of employed populations 
in this region are engaged in non-agriculture related work and the overall 
economy has started to shift from agriculture to service activities; around 
40% people work in the service sector (LFS 2018). As such, unlike 
BWDB and DAE, other organizations are mostly in favor of prioritizing 
agriculture equal to or less than overall economy. Such differences in their 
prioritization feed into the differences in their overall vulnerability 
framings (Table 2.3). In sum, some organizations prioritize agricultural 
criteria because of their operational objectives, but other organizations put 
similar or lesser emphasis than economic criteria. Difference in 
vulnerability framing point us to the likelihoods that what may be 
perceived as climate change adaptation may actually be underpinned by 
different understanding and unspoken assumption held by the stakeholders 
involved.   
Table 2.3: Differences in mean value between organizations in terms of 
agricultural criteria weighting 
Organizations BWDB LGED DAE FD NGOs 
BWDB  0.043 -0.017 0.050 -0.087* 
LGED   -0.060* 0.007 0.043 
DAE    0.067* 0.103** 
FD     0.037 
ANOVA Diagnostic F-statistics: 9.159** 
Significance p-value: ‗***‘<0.001, ‗**‘<0.01, ‗*‘<0.05 
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2.4.1.3. Social 
 Social criteria are less emphasized by the leading government 
organizations. This is not surprising.  For example, BWDB, LGED, and 
DAE emphasized social aspects less compared to other criteria. This is 
partly due to their operational objectives and long term planning goals, 
which do not address social criteria directly. Notably, LGED is actively 
involved in reducing the poverty rate and increasing the education rate by 
constructing market centers and multipurpose emergency shelters, and 
connecting remote areas through roadways. Also, DAE is engaged in 
poverty reduction by intensifying crop production, distributing climate 
resilient crop varieties, and educating farmers. Nevertheless, while these 
organizations think that social criteria are crucial for adaptive capacity 
development, they believe that focus should be given to strengthening 
infrastructures. For instance, the district level BWDB said: ‗certainly, 
social criteria are important, but if you don‘t have infrastructural support 
or a good base of agriculture for your economy, it really doesn‘t matter 
whether you have high education or low population density.‘ While they 
might be true to some extent, such biasness towards infrastructure based 
understanding is not new in vulnerability literature.   
 Social criteria are ranked highly by FD and NGOs. The operational 
objectives of NGOs primarily include poverty reduction, increase of 
education, health and demographic development etc. In that respect, their 
prioritization of social criteria reflects their operational interest. Grounded 
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on social science knowledge, NGOs takes a distinctive perspective and 
give higher weightings of social criteria. For this reason, the district and 
sub-district level FD are rather interesting. Although FD primarily deals 
with suppressing the impacts of natural disturbances through 
afforestation/reforestation, it contributes to the socio-economic 
development of individuals through social forestry. As such, the ANOVA 
test does not indicate much difference except with NGOs (Table 2.4). 
Overall, social criteria receive less focus from the organizations unless it 
falls under their operational objectives. 
Table 2.4: Differences in mean value between organizations in terms of 
social criteria weighting 
Organizations BWDB LGED DAE FD NGOs 
BWDB  -0.057 -0.030 -0.070 -1.433** 
LGED   0.027 -0.013 -0.087 
DAE    -0.040 -0.113* 
FD     -0.073 
ANOVA Diagnostic F-statistics: 6.611** 
Significance p-value: ‗***‘<0.001, ‗**‘<0.01, ‗*‘<0.05 
 
2.4.1.4. Economic 
Economic criteria are ranked moderately by LGED, FD, and 
NGOs, while the remaining organizations ranked these as low. The local 
economy has been prioritized in the operational objectives of LGED and 
NGOs. These two organizations actively participate in building economic 
centers, reducing the poverty rate, providing micro-credit to the marginal 
farmers, and connecting remote areas with major markets. Although FD 
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does not directly engage with economic development, they think that 
widespread poverty make people more vulnerable, ‗this region is so low in 
elevation that a complete prohibition of flooding is nearly impossible. For 
this reason, an agriculture-based economy would not be helpful in 
diminishing poverty. We should focus more on economic development 
rather than only agriculture.‘ However, BWDB and DAE think otherwise. 
According to them, agriculture determines economic prosperity of the 
region. Although they acknowledged that some other dominant non-
agricultural occupations exist, they characterized the occupations as 
indirectly or directly dependent on agriculture. In the words of DAE, ‗the 
first victim of floods is usually the farmers. These farmers are dependent 
on agriculture and most often they do not have bank balance or any other 
financial support. Unless we can protect their economic means (aka 
agriculture), poverty cannot be eliminated from this region.‘ Such 
discrepancies in weighting have partly been observed through the 
ANOVA test (Table 2.5). In short, the organizations had differing 
opinions on the prioritization of economic and agricultural criteria. While 
some put more emphasis on economy than agriculture, others did the 
opposite.    
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Table 2.5: Differences in mean value between organizations in terms of 
economic criteria weighting 
Organizations BWDB LGED DAE FD NGOs 
BWDB  -0.057 0.000 -0.057 -0.105** 
LGED   0.057 0.000 -0.048 
DAE    -0.057 0.105** 
FD     -0.048 
ANOVA Diagnostic F-statistics: 8.238** 
Significance p-value: ‗***‘<0.001, ‗**‘<0.01, ‗*‘<0.05 
 
2.4.1.5. Natural 
Among studied organizations, BWDB ranked natural criteria high, 
and the rest put it on moderate weighting; however, only the FD and 
NGOs have a significant difference with BWDB in weighting (Table 2.6). 
BWDB is responsible for hydrological operations including river dredging 
and construction of embankment. As a result, they are at the forefront of 
dealing the tidal fluctuations, river bank erosion, sedimentation and other 
natural phenomenon. BWDB acknowledges that low elevation, proximity 
to rivers/sea, and less tree cover can make certain parts of the region more 
vulnerable than others and the protective infrastructures can reduce 
vulnerability to some extent.  Because of the operational objectives, 
BWDB ranked natural criteria higher than the other organizations, yet the 
importance of natural criteria is recognized by all.  
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Table 2.6: Differences in mean value between organizations in terms of 
natural criteria weighting 
Organizations BWDB LGED DAE FD NGOs 
BWDB  0.040 0.053* 0.063** 0.070** 
LGED   0.013 0.023 0.030 
DAE    0.010 0.017 
FD     0.007 
ANOVA Diagnostic F-statistics: 9.058** 
Significance p-value: ‗***‘<0.001, ‗**‘<0.01, ‗*‘<0.05 
 
2.4.1.6. Land Use 
 Land use criteria are prioritized by BWDB and DAE as they are of 
primary concern by these organizations; however, there is no significant 
difference in prioritization by other organizations represented by the 
ANOVA test. BWDB aims to limit spread of soil salinity and maintain 
fertile lands, while DAE is concerned of expanding crop production area. 
Both of these organizations think that the region becomes more vulnerable 
when land use criteria are affected. Unlike district and sub-district level 
FD, the national level FD considers land use criteria as an important 
determinant and they think that greater forested or vegetated area ensures 
less vulnerability. Overall, all organizations put moderate to low weight on 
land use criteria depending on their operational objectives. 
 
2.4.1.7. Household Characteristics 
 Household characteristics are ranked the lowest criteria by all the 
organizations. They admitted that the household characteristics are 
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important for flood vulnerability; however, in their view, considering the 
biophysical and socio-economic criteria, household characteristics should 
get the least priority in vulnerability determination. As such, the ANOVA 
test shows that there are no significant differences among organizations in 
weighting household criteria. I think such weighting might have resulted 
from the fact that addressing household characteristics directly are beyond 
the scope of any organization‘s working domain.  
 
Figure 2.4: Vulnerability framings by the studied organizations at each sector and 
level. 
 
As a whole, in the criteria weighting I observed no significant difference 
across levels of governance, but significant mean differences were found among 
organizations. The following figure shows a comparative average weighting of 
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the criteria by the organizations (Fig. 2.5). Notably, mean weight values of 
different levels for each organization were considered. It is evident from Fig 4 
that the infrastructural and agricultural criteria received higher weight than other 
criteria by most of the organizations, while household characteristics received less 
attention. Clearly, infrastructure and agricultural are widely deemed important to 
reduce vulnerability to environmental stressors in the region. As an exception, the 
NGOs put relatively more weight in social and economic criteria, reflecting their 
working domain. The largest variances in weighting were particularly observed in 
the case of social, economic, and agricultural criteria. 
 
Figure 2.5: Comparative criteria weighting by the studied organizations 
 
2.4.2. Vulnerability Hotspots 
 Global spatial autocorrelation (Moran‘s I) indicates that the vulnerability 
is not random, instead it is clustered over specific spatial scale, as one would 
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expect. The hotspot analysis reveals that hot and cold spots are similar according 
to the framings of all organizations across all levels (Fig. 2.6). Based on their 
framings, Hizla, Muladi, and Mehendiganj sub-district in the northeastern part are 
vulnerability hotspots. These areas are characterized by high poverty, located very 
close to the Meghna River, and with few concrete-built houses and flood shelters. 
On the other hand, Betagi, Bamna, Kanthalia, Mirzaganj, and Rajapur in the 
south-central zone are vulnerability cold spots, because of greater distance from 
major rivers and sea, low poverty rate, greater number of shelters, and high 
literacy rate.  
 
Figure 2.6: Vulnerability hotspots identified by organizations at each sector and 
level 
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2.5. Discussion 
Bangladesh‘s efforts in climate change mainstreaming have likely had an 
influence on the homogeneity in vulnerability framings. Nevertheless, discrepancies in 
the framings are noticeable in a few instances (Fig. 5, 6). I suspect that such discrepancies 
are exhibited predominantly because of the sectoral policies and operational objectives of 
the organizations interviewed. For instance, operational objectives of DAE include 
ensuring food security through the provision of agricultural services. As such, DAE 
prioritizes agriculture over other criteria. Again, the sectoral policies of LGED and 
BWDB emphasize infrastructure related issues, and for this reason, these two 
organizations prioritize infrastructure while put less emphasis on social criteria. 
Similarly, NGOs have different agendas that are more specific to a particular issue (e.g. 
health, education) or constituencies (e.g. poor, vulnerable).  
The ways in which organizational mandates affect framings and understanding of 
vulnerability is not surprising. Indeed, some scholars of geospatial analysis have posited 
that connotative features of landscape attributes should be considered explicitly in policy 
making. Bibby and Shepard (2005) to have three ontological dimensions: the constitutive 
– the objective condition and state of landscape features (e.g., elevation, water depth 
etc.), the agentive – referring to how actors interact with the landscape (e.g., 
deforestation), and the telic dimension – referring to the function of specific attributes in 
light of the organizational mandate and intention of a specific actor (see also discussion 
in Bojórquez et al. 2011).  Here I see evidence that the telic dimension of landscape 
features comes into play in differentiating the ways that the different sector organizations 
frame vulnerability, to some extent.  
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Discrepancies in vulnerability framings are sometimes considered to be of 
concern, as perhaps indicative of conflict or a potential for inefficiencies in management. 
In this case, I think that the discrepancy in vulnerability framings between NGOs and 
other organizations is not a matter of concern, but rather indicates how a diversity of 
agendas and sectoral roles can be complementary in adaptation. In particular, it appears 
that NGOs are filling the gaps in vulnerability management where government 
organizations are deficient (Batley & Rose 2011). This complementary relationship with 
the government is represented through an active participation of NGOs in the socio-
economic sector, specifically in education, health, and sanitation (Nair 2011, Rose 2011). 
Sansom (2011), for example, noted that limited resources of government organizations 
created an institutional space for NGOs in sanitation sector in Bangladesh and soon 
NGOs became a leading player in this sector. However, many NGOs are relatively 
narrow and limited in functionality. As such NGOs are playing vital roles in covering 
distinct foci not emphasized by the government in socio-economic sectors, some gaps 
might still persist. 
Socio-politically, response to large scale environmental problems affect and are 
affected by multilevel governance, and homogeneity in understanding of the problem by 
stakeholders spanning across scale is desirable to addressing issue more effectively 
(Lemos & Agrawal 2006). In our case, cross-level interactions among multilevel 
organizations played a critical role in the homogeneity of vulnerability framings. Cross-
level interactions of information and knowledge flow are important as they offer insights 
on how to deal with multisectoral issues (Cash et al. 2006, Young 2006, Termeer et al. 
2010). Vertical (across different levels) and horizontal (across same level) linkages 
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among organizations determine the information and knowledge flow among them (Young 
2002). In Bangladesh, vertical networks among sectoral organizations are well 
established in terms of information and knowledge flow. In this study, similar framings 
of vulnerability across sectors and levels of governance indicates greater information and 
knowledge flow which can potentially reduce the cross-scalar conflicts in managing 
limited resources (Adger et al. 2005, 2006). The reciprocity of the flow is maintained to 
some extent in this network; however, vertical relationship does not exist across sectors. 
To illustrate, the local level FD will not generally interact with higher level BWDB. On 
the other hand, the sub-national level horizontal interactions are quite frequent, but 
national level horizontal interaction is limited. At the sub-national level, the district and 
sub-district administrations hold a meeting in every 2 – 4 months regarding the actions 
undertaken in different sectors such as, agriculture, forest etc. This meeting is attended by 
all major organizations engaged in vulnerability management. In this meeting, these 
organizations share their action updates and requirements from other organizations. This 
meeting also aims to resolve confusions, conflicts, and misunderstandings among 
organizations, if any. Furthermore, these organizations are also connected with each other 
through need-based informal interactions. In case of any immediate requirement at the 
sub-national level, an organization can contact the another directly and resolve minor 
issues. For example, if the sub-national level FD encounters problems in tree plantation 
over the embankments, they contact the same level BWDB officials to discuss and 
resolve their concerns. Again, if the BWDB faces difficulties in constructing 
embankments because of local political dynamics, they can seek law and order assistance 
from district or sub-district administrations. This structure of strong sectoral vertical 
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linkages and moderately-strong horizontal cross-sector linkages may represent a 
particularly robust configuration for adaptation governance. It provides consistency in 
sectoral policy, and allows generic principles regarding adaptation to permeate from the 
national level to local level actors. The strong horizontal linkages provide a capacity for 
refinement, precision and coordination necessary in the operationalization of such generic 
principles in specific social and environmental contexts. Due to these frequent 
interactions, they often have a good understanding of each other‘s understanding of 
vulnerability. Furthermore, our interviews with the organization officials reveals that the 
government promotes discussion on climate change impacts at different levels of 
governance, provides documentation and training to the officials, and appreciates the 
inclusion of climate change in the short-term and medium-term projects. Also, the 
government encourages NGOs to play active roles in enhancing local adaptive capacity, 
and thus channels 10% of the $170 million Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund 
to them (GED 2015). I suspect that such promotion of cross-level interactions contributes 
to the alignment of the vulnerability framings of these organizations.  
While similar understanding of vulnerability offers insights on dealing with 
complex multisectoral issues, it can also raise some concerns such as what has been 
called the ‗coordination dilemma‘ and ‗work scope overlapping‘ (Termeer et al. 2010). 
Coordination dilemma occurs when coordinating among a large number of stakeholders 
demands significant time and resources, and overlapping happens when two or more 
organizations address the same issue similarly. Such overlapping becomes evident in 
coastal Bangladesh when LGED, in one instance, planted trees in their project areas 
whereas it was supposed to be done by FD with a lower expenditure. 
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Overall, the alignment in vulnerability framing indicates that the leading 
organizations working in different sectors understand vulnerability in similar 
homogeneous way. Such similar understanding is important for avoiding fragmented 
development initiatives and undertaking vulnerability reduction measures for those who 
need it the most. I found that the locations of adaptation projects by the leading 
organizations correspond to their vulnerability framings. I obtained the details of 
currently running projects from their websites and found that the sub-districts of Barisal 
and Patuakhali districts have higher climate adaptation related projects running now than 
other districts. In Barisal, each sub-district has around 12 running projects on an average, 
and in Patuakhali, the number is 15. Relatively less vulnerable Pirojpur and Barguna 
districts have 10 running projects in each sub-district, and the sub-districts under 
Jhalkathi district have only four projects. I think that the vulnerability framing might not 
directly contribute in developing these projects, but it might influence these undertakings 
circuitously. In this way, on one hand, homogeneity in framings assists the decision 
makers to undertake investment decisions and effective adaptation actions, and on the 
other hand, diversity in the framing of FD and NGO represent emphasis on different 
sectors.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
    As discussed in this paper, vulnerability framing has been described as a process 
by which stakeholders construct meaning to understanding the consequences of particular 
event or occurrence.  Although vulnerability to climate change is intuitively framed one 
way or another, it plays an important role in research, policy development and policy 
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implementation. Framing allows certain questions to be asked repeatedly and with 
emphasis at the cost of other equally important ones.  Our study contributes to multilevel 
vulnerability research through an analysis of vulnerability framings at different sectors 
and levels of governance. I developed a spatial MCDA approach by creating a key-
informant led composite vulnerability index and identifying vulnerability hotspots. 
Overall, the study found a significant alignment in the vulnerability framings of leading 
organizations operating at the forefront of climate vulnerability management in coastal 
Bangladesh. However, the NGOs I consulted showed a significant difference in framing, 
primarily because of the difference in their working domain, mandates and sectoral 
priority. In essence, for NGO, framing is truly social process that relates to the way 
individual (or household) interact in social groups. Since vulnerability framing, especially 
from social science perspective, is embedded in, and part of, social, cultural and political 
processes, it has the potential to determine certain pathways to climate vulnerability and 
its response. For this reason, stakeholders engaged in managing vulnerability are able to 
reflect on preconceived framing and engaged in the development of shared framing of 
vulnerability.  
Most of the organizations, irrespective of sectors or levels, acknowledge the 
importance of infrastructure and agriculture in reducing vulnerability in the region. Such 
similar understanding of the organizations would minimize resistance in decision making, 
actuate information and resource flow, and thus be facilitative to efficient adaptation 
governance across coastal areas. I also observed some minor misalignments across the 
sectors. These mismatches in framing are likely the result of different operational 
objectives which indicate diversity in understanding and, ultimately, a more complete 
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governance of adaptation and vulnerability in the region. However, while similar 
understanding of vulnerability indicate a priority on infrastructural and agricultural 
criteria, it is probable that other criteria are less emphasized, if not ignored, potentially to 
the detriment of addressing vulnerability effectively. The implications of such neglect 
could be demonstrated as a reduction of exposure with no substantial impact on adaptive 
capacity or sensitivity. The research presented here indicates that it is not enough to have 
vulnerability assessments and adaptation plans in place; it is also important to evaluate 
the assumptions about the determinants of vulnerability held by different agencies, and 
how these assumptions manifest in spatial understanding of vulnerability and adaptation 
investments. Vulnerability has both subjective and objective dimensions; by making the 
subjective dimensions explicit, the governance of vulnerability can be made more 
effective. By investigating the framing of vulnerability across scale, this paper reveals 
theories, concepts, and approaches as well as their proliferation through professional 
training and sectoral approaches.
  61 
CHAPTER 3 
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: 
STRUCTURE, PROCESSES, AND POWER DYNAMICS 
3.1. Introduction 
Climate change impacts do not maintain territorial jurisdictions and can be 
observed at multiple levels: global, regional, or local (Wilbanks & Kates 1999, Cash & 
Moser 2000, Cash et al. 2006, Termeer et al. 2010). Effective and efficient climate 
response requires engagement of multiple actors in different sectors and at different 
levels of governance (Adger et al. 2005, Amundsen et al. 2010, Eakin & Patt 2011, Bauer 
et al. 2012). While the national governments play key roles in country-specific climate 
adaptation policy and practices, increased participations of local government, civil 
societies, and NGOs have fostered local level adaptation (Keskitalo 2010, Juhola & 
Westerhoff 2011, Haque et al. 2015). The constellation of diverse actors and their 
interactions should facilitate climate change governance but their structure of 
arrangement and power dynamics can have variable effects on adaptation process 
(Bulkeley & Moser 2007, Keskitalo 2010, Bauer et al. 2012).  
Limited attempts have been made using the concept of multilevel governance 
(MLG) to understand the influence of actors‘ structure and interactions in adaptation 
governance (see Keskitalo 2010, Bates et al. 2013, Fidelman et al. 2013, Verkerk et al. 
2015), yet we still have limited evidence on how power dynamics among actors influence 
the adaptation governance process, particularly in the context of Global South (but see 
Bisaro et al. 2010, Di Gregorio et al. 2019). Furthermore, there has been a limited 
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emphasis in MLG research on how interactions among actors affect the structure of the 
adaptation governance. With a particular focus on adaptation to coastal flooding in 
Bangladesh, this study aims to address these limitations by analyzing the structure of 
organizational network in adaptation governance and the interactions through which 
power dynamics unfold and affect the adaptation governance processes.       
This research contributes to the existing literature of climate adaptation in at least 
three ways. First, it uses a novel social network analysis approach to identify the 
influence of different organizations in the adaptation governance process based on their 
collaboration and cooperation networks. Second, it explores the nature of organizational 
interactions in large-scale adaptation actions in Bangladesh. Third, by analyzing the 
power relations, it examines how organizational power dynamics affect the adaptation 
governance process. In the next section, I first provide a background of the two concepts 
I am operationalizing for analysis- MLG and power (section 2). I then present our 
hypotheses on which I conduct our analysis (section 3). Next I discuss our research 
methods in section 4. I report our results on the structure and processes of adaptation 
governance in the following section. I conclude with a discussion on the policy 
implications and suggestions.  
3.2. Conceptual Background 
3.2.1. Multilevel governance 
3.2.1.1. Conceptual clarification 
I define MLG as a decision-making arrangement that involves a 
multiplicity of interdependent public and private actors operating at 
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multiple territorial or political levels in which decision-making power is 
dispersed along the vertical and horizontal interactions of actors (Marks 
1993). The fundamental notion of MLG is that decision making takes 
place in a pluralistic and highly dispersed policy-making milieu, where 
multiple actors participate at various political levels from supranational to 
sub-national or local (Stephenson 2013). MLG describes different roles of 
actors operating at different political and/or jurisdictional levels (Peters & 
Pierre 2001). Globalization and associated social mobilization have 
enabled participation of multiple actors in governance and enhanced inter-
sectoral cooperation throughout the world (Alcantara et al. 2015). For this 
reason, despite its conception in the European milieu, MLG concept has 
been used to analyze the institutional and policy dynamics of multi-actor 
governance arrangements in other parts of the world as well. However, 
before directly applying the MLG concept to any multi-actor governance 
context, three critiques of MLG must be addressed pertaining to the a) 
inclusion/exclusion of specific actors in MLG, b) lack of attention to 
process in MLG, and c) boundaries of MLG.  
As the MLG was first conceptualized in a context where a 
supranational actor, the EU, was dominant, it was implicit that the 
presence of a supranational actor would be required to analyze MLG. 
However, more recent conceptual applications relaxed the supranational 
requirement and applied the MLG concept to settings as diverse as 
federations, international cooperation, and unitary states (Tortola 2017). 
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On the other hand, the role of non-state actors has been treated as equal or 
subordinate to state actors (Bruszt 2008, Piattoni 2010). Furthermore, it 
has been argued that the MLG concept puts too much focus on the 
structure of the multi-actor network and little attention towards the 
interrelationships and power relations (Bache 2008). There are some 
studies that address both structures and processes of MLG networks 
(Tortola 2017) but the analysis of power relations has been limited. 
However, determining the boundary of governance is tricky because there 
is a difference between engagement and influence, between a seat at the 
table and a real voice in crafting policy (Bache 2008, Norman and Bakker 
2009). MLG takes an inclusive approach in defining governance by 
incorporating multi-level actors that interact across and around formal 
structures of representative government in decision making processes 
(Klijn and Skelcher 2007). Notably, decision making processes comprise 
not only of policy formulation or coordination processes, but also 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation processes. As such, MLG 
doesn‘t have to involve a full and sustained relationship among all actors 
throughout the decision making process, the interrelationships can be 
active or latent at different stages of decision making process (Alcantara et 
al. 2015).  
The interactions of actors in a MLG structure can be dictated by 
the nature of the multi-actor network. Empirical evidence suggests that a 
closed nature of the network, in which the interactions are mostly limited 
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among certain actors, facilitates cooperation and collaboration, while an 
open nature, in which interactions take place among all or most of the 
actors in a network, indicates knowledge and resource sharing (Berardo & 
Scholz 2010, Lubell et al. 2014). For instance, Hileman & Lubell (2018) 
found that the multilevel water governance network in Central America 
balances the local level collaboration represented by closed network with 
regional level knowledge sharing represented by open network. The nature 
of the network does not relate to particular type of MLG, rather they can 
be embedded in any type.    
 
3.2.1.2. MLG in climate adaptation 
Climate adaptation studies have used the MLG concept to explain 
and examine the structure and processes of the multi-actor networks 
involved in adaptation management. Although Betsill and Bulkeley 
(2006), Bulkeley and Betsill (2005), and Lee and Koski (2015) used MLG 
concept in climate change governance to explore the roles of sub-national 
actors in climate policy response processes, the use of MLG concept 
specifically focusing on climate adaptation began with the work of 
Keskitalo (2010). Keskitalo (2010) showed that MLG can be embedded in 
the existing governance structure, be it centralized or decentralized. More 
recently, Verkerk et al. (2015) argued that MLG in climate adaptation is 
characterized by a discontinuous chain of actions, and it is strengthened by 
instances of synchronization among multiple actors. However, Fidelman et 
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al. (2013) found that episodic and task-specific ideas about MLG are not 
sufficient to govern a response to a complex, multi-sectoral issue like 
climate adaptation. Instead, more stable, continuous, and inclusive 
interactions among the actors can provide more effective outcomes. In 
general, these studies have found that non-government and private actors 
also play significant roles in adaptation management, but the 
governmental organizations are at the vanguard. While these studies 
demonstrate how organizations are embedded in MLG networks, they lack 
analysis of power dynamics in the network and their implications for 
decision making. Also, more evidence on MLG in different political and 
social contexts is needed (Blom-Hansen 2005, Di Gregorio 2019); in 
general, the existing set of MLG-related climate adaptation studies lack 
evidence from climate-vulnerable Global South, where institutional 
arrangements can also be fragmented or fragile depending on the 
economic and political context. In this study, focusing on a case from 
Global South I used the MLG concept to understand the structure and 
processes of adaptation governance. 
3.2.2. Power 
In this study, power is defined as the organizational and discursive 
capacity to achieve outcomes in social practices (Arts & Tatenhove 2004). 
Insights into the sources and dimensions of power can help evaluate the 
mechanisms of adaptation governance (Crona and Bodin 2010, Duit et al. 2010) 
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and assess the performance of governance (Hayward & Lukes 2008). 
Understanding which actor is more powerful than others, and in what ways, can 
lead to improved policy and institutional design (Sherman & Ford 2014). 
The concept of power is long debated and its theorization and 
operationalization are essentially contested (Lukes 1974, Baldwin 2002, Avelino 
& Rotmas 2011, Boonstra 2016). In this paper, I adopted the conceptualization of 
power developed by Arts & van Tatenhove (2004) as an effective way to analyze 
the power dynamics in multilevel adaptation governance where power can be 
observed in the interactions among actors, in actors‘ capacities, and in the 
structure of the multi-actor network. Building from earlier theorizations (i.e. 
Weber 1978, Gidden 1984, Clegg 1989), Arts & van Tatenhove (2004) converge 
the dichotomy of actor-centered and structure-centered conceptualizations of 
power.  Based on their conceptualization, I adopted two types of power: 
dispositional and structural to analyze our case (Table 1). Dispositional power 
indicates actor‘s capacity to act using the resources it possesses and abiding by 
the institutional rules. This power can be invoked from material and ideational 
sources. Material sources primarily represent financial capacity and human 
resources, while ideational sources include knowledge, ideas, and information 
(Fuchs & Glaab 2011, Orsini 2013). For instance, in Nepal, the non-state actors 
used their material resources to arrange a converging space (i.e. meeting) for all 
stakeholders in preparation of the local adaptation plan of actions (Vij et al. 
2018), however, experts and consultants often used ideational sources (i.e. 
knowledge) to dominate the policy processes and demoted the affected citizens 
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(Ojha et al. 2016, Vij et al. 2018). Structural power is a macro-level phenomenon 
that shapes the nature and behavior of actors through order of significance, 
legitimization, legal means, and economic institutions, and can be characterized 
as authority. Authority can be defined as the perceived legitimized exercise of 
power by a certain actor to influence other actors or their interactions (Sikor & 
Lund 2009, Eriksen et al. 2015). For example, in a centralized regime, the 
structure of governance gives maximum authority to the central (i.e. national 
level) actors, enabling them to exercise power over other actors (Pahl-Wostl and 
Knieper 2014). Notably, dispositional and structural power can be intrinsically 
embroiled and, in an instance of interaction among actors, both of them can be 
wielded together (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Conceptualization of power in this study.   
Type of 
power 
Representative 
form 
Example 
Dispositional Material A uses its financial or infrastructural capacity to influence 
the decision-making process that involves B. 
Ideational A uses its knowledge or information to influence the 
decision-making process that involves B. 
Structural Authority A uses legally/legitimately acquired/given power to 
influence B or the decision-making process that involves B. 
 
3.3. Research Hypotheses 
To analyze the adaptation governance in Bangladesh, I formulated the following 
four hypotheses to test. In Bangladesh, the public sector‘s administrative structure is 
broadly divided into three levels: national, district, and sub-district. The sub-district (local 
name: upazilla) level is considered as the local level and together with district level, they 
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are treated as subnational level. Our first two hypotheses are based on the nature of the 
governance network: closed network helps facilitate cooperation, while open network 
may help knowledge sharing and resource distribution (Berardo & Scholz 2010, Lubell et 
al. 2014, Hileman & Lubell 2018).  
H1: The subnational level adaptation governance is driven by cooperation and 
collaboration, and thus will show higher clustering. 
H2: The national level adaptation governance is dominated by knowledge and 
resource sharing, and thus will show higher degree and between centralities.  
 The third hypothesis is informed by empirical evidence from natural resource 
governance: a densely interlinked and highly central actor will likely have higher 
influence over the network than actors who are peripheral or less densely linked (Yamaki 
2017, Blanc et al. 2018). The last hypothesis is based on the classic MLG theory (Hooghe 
& Marks 2001, 2003). 
H3: The national level organizations have higher influence than the subnational 
level organizations over the adaptation governance, as evidenced by the centrality 
measures and core/periphery analysis. 
H4: The adaptation governance is dominated by top-down governance as 
evidenced by the distribution of authority top to down in few levels of 
governance. 
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3.4. Methods 
3.4.1. Selection of organizations and data collection 
I identified the organizations associated with adaptation governance 
process through an online search and snowball sampling. Our network context 
was coastal areas and our network boundary was initially open so that I could 
include as many organizations as possible. I began our selection process by 
identifying the government organizations from the websites of sectoral ministries 
(e.g. agriculture, water resource). After reviewing the functions and activities of 
the organizations, I selected only those organizations whose mandates include 
adaptation to flood in coastal areas. From the websites of each of these 
organizations I identified their partners and thus expanded our network. In order 
to obtain the directionality of partnership I reviewed the websites of those partner 
organizations as well. At this stage I identified 19 organizations. I used snowball 
sampling to expand this initial sample. This step was important, because I found 
that none of the non-governmental organizations‘ websites contained any 
information on their partnerships with other organizations. I also recognized that 
the government organizations‘ websites might exclude some organizations with 
whom they work in practice.   
I prepared a semi-structured questionnaire and interviewed the key 
informants in the initial list of organizations with substantial knowledge on that 
organization‘s activities and who held enough authority to comment as a 
representative of that organization. I specifically asked them about their partners 
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in the adaptation processes: ―With which organization/s do you work to plan and 
implement adaptation actions?‖ I also asked for the frequency of inter-
organization interactions and the main purpose of each interaction. I found that 
tens of national/local NGOs were working independently in the livelihood sector 
of adaptation governance without significant partnerships. In the adaptation 
governance network, they are represented either as isolates (no ties) or pendants 
(a single tie). These NGOs can have variable influences, but I am concerned about 
the structure of the governance network which is composed of collaboration and 
coordination network. For this reason, I removed the isolates from the network 
and considered all other NGOs as a single node (or organization). Also, I 
excluded disaster management related organizations as they focus on disaster 
preparedness and recover, not on adaptation.  
Through this process I identified a total of 37 organizations that are 
involved in the adaptation governance process (Table 3.2). Notably, the 
subnational level offices of some organizations (i.e. DAE, BWDB, LGED) were 
considered as separate organizations because these offices had independent 
decision-making and implementation power. Similarly, for NGOs, I considered 
their head office, at the national level, and the field office, most often at the sub-
district level, as separate nodes due to their independent decision implementation 
power. To draw the boundary of the governance network, I considered those 
organizations that are in regular collaboration with each other, and thus 
disregarded rare collaborations with university departments or short-term 
committees.   
  72 
In order to analyze the adaptation governance process, I continued asking 
the key-informants about the governance measures they undertake.  
Table 3.2: Selected organizations and their acronyms 
Organization Acronym Organization Acronym 
Ministry of Water Resources MOWR Ministry of Agriculture MOA 
Ministry of Environment, 
Forest and Climate Change 
MOEFCC Ministry of Social Welfare MSW 
Ministry of  Local Government LGD Ministry of Planning MOP 
Bangladesh Water 
Development Board- National 
level 
BWDB_N Development Aid Agencies DAAs 
Bangladesh Water 
Development Board- District 
level 
BWDB_D Department of Environment DOE 
Bangladesh Water 
Development Board- Sub-
district level 
BWDB_SD River Research Institute RRI 
Local Government Engineering 
Department- National level 
LGED_N Water Resources Planning 
Organization 
WARPO 
Local Government Engineering 
Department- District level 
LGED_D Bangladesh Agricultural 
Development Corporation- 
National level 
BADC_N 
Local Government Engineering 
Department- Sub-district level 
LGED_SD Bangladesh Agricultural 
Development Corporation- 
District level 
BADC_D 
Department of Agricultural 
Extension- National level 
DAE_N Bangladesh Agricultural 
Research Council 
BARC 
Department of Agricultural 
Extension- District level 
DAE_D Bangladesh Agricultural 
Research Institute 
BARI 
Department of Agricultural 
Extension- Sub-district level 
DAE_SD Bangladesh Rice Research 
Institute 
BRRI 
Forest Department- National 
level 
FD_N Bangladesh Institute of 
Nuclear Agriculture 
BINA 
Forest Department- District 
level 
FD_D Seed Certification Agency SCA 
Forest Department- Sub-district 
level 
FD_SD Soil Resource Development 
Institute 
SRDI 
Institute of Water Modeling IWM Center for Environmental 
and Geographic Information 
Services 
CEGIS 
District Administration DA Sub-district Administration SDA 
NGOs- National level NGO_N International NGOs INGO 
NGOs- Sub-district level NGO_L Ministry of Finance MOF 
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3.4.2. Social Network Analysis 
I used social network analysis (SNA) to analyze the characteristics of the 
multi-actor governance network. SNA enables the analysis of the 
interrelationships and interactions among the actors, which they establish through 
collaboration, coordination, and cooperation. The structural characteristics of the 
network can provide information about knowledge transfer, resource 
mobilization, stakeholder diversity, and power asymmetry (Adger 2003, Borgatti 
& Foster 2003, Bodin et al. 2006).  
To address our hypotheses, I used a series of network measures at two 
levels of governance (national and sub-national): density, mean degree centrality, 
degree centralization, mean betweenness centrality, and local clustering 
coefficient (Table 3.3). I used the ‗sna‘ and ‗statnet‘ package in the R 
programming environment to undertake the analysis. These measures help us to 
compare the organizational network at different levels of governance and identify 
the influential organizations across the network. However, centrality scores are 
node-based measurements, while the influence of an organization additionally 
depends on its overall position in the governance structure in addition to its 
centrality. As such, I conducted a core-periphery analysis and brokerage analysis 
to complement the centrality analysis. 
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Table 3.3: Social network measures and their relationships to governance  
Network 
structure 
measure 
Definition Relationship to governance 
Density Overall connectivity of 
the network and is 
measured as the ratio of 
observed ties to the 
maximum possible ties. 
Higher density facilitates collaboration and 
builds trust (Ostrom 1990, Burt 2003) but may 
cause homogenization of knowledge and 
experience as well (Crona & Bodin 2006). 
Degree 
Centrality 
A node-level measure of 
connection. 
Higher degree centrality represents significance 
of the actor in the governance process through 
mobilizing resources to action and diffusing 
information to other stakeholders. A highly 
central actor must mobilize a lot of energy to 
maintain connections, as a result, whether the 
actor can significantly influence others is 
arguable (Prell et al. 2009). 
Degree 
Centralization 
A measure of the extent to 
which a network is 
dominated by one or more 
high-degree nodes. 
Higher degree centralization indicates the 
dominance of few actors in the governance 
process (Hileman & Lubell 2018). High degree 
centralization might represent an efficient 
information transfer and decision making 
system, but at the same time it can create a 
centralized governance structure and prohibits 
innovation and learning (Bodin et al. 2009). 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
A node-level measure of 
the extent to which a node 
lies in path of other nodes.  
Higher betweenness centrality indicates higher 
bridging capacity. The actor with a high 
betweenness centrality can have greater 
influence over the network by controlling the 
flow of information and resources and 
facilitating communication (Bodin & Crona 
2006, Baggio et al. 2015).    
Clustering 
Coefficient 
A network-level measure 
of the degree to which 
nodes in a network tend to 
cluster together.  
Higher clustering coefficient indicates high 
level of cooperation and collaboration in the 
governance process (Hileman & Lubell 2018). 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
A node-level measure of 
the degree of influence a 
node has based on its 
connections and the 
number of links those 
connections have. 
Higher eigenvector centrality indicates that the 
actor is connected to other stakeholders who 
further have good connections in the 
governance network. As a result, an actor with 
high eigenvector centrality has higher reach 
and influence in the governance process 
(Barnes-Mauthe et al. 2015). 
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Core-periphery analysis explores the core and periphery of the network. I 
conceived the core-periphery structure based on the one-group intuitive 
conception by Borgatti & Everett (2000). The idea assumes that all the actors in 
the network largely belong to one group: in our case, the adaptation governance 
process. The core and periphery of the network is determined by the connection of 
the actors. A core comprises of densely interlinked actors, which is located at the 
center of the network, while the peripheral actors have relatively loose connection 
with the center (Yamaki 2017). I used UCINET software to undertake the core-
periphery analysis. I further performed brokerage analysis to understand how 
these organizations act as ‗middleman‘ and control and influence the information 
flow, knowledge transfer, collaboration opportunities in the network (Burt 2005). 
The brokers can be categorized into five types based on the position of the broker 
and the information or resource flow in the network (Gould & Fernandez 1989): 
liaison, itinerant, coordinator, gatekeeper, and representative (see Table 3.4 and 
Figure 3.1). I used ‗sna‘ package in R to conduct the brokerage analysis. 
Table 3.4: Brokerage types and functions 
Type of Broker Function 
Liaison A liaison broker acts as a channel for communication for two different 
groups to which it does not belong. 
Itinerant An itinerant broker plays more of a consultant role and connects two or 
more actors who belong to the same group but do not have connections 
between/among them. 
Coordinator A coordinator broker belongs to the same group to which other actors it 
connects belong. 
Gatekeeper A gatekeeper broker controls the information or resource flow towards its 
group from outside group. 
Representative A representative broker is positioned in the network similarly as a 
gatekeeper, but the representative broker channels the information or 
resource of its own group to actors outside its group. 
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Based on the centrality scores and core-periphery analysis, I categorized 
the influences of the organizations into high, medium, and low. Organizations that 
have all three centrality scores (i.e. degree, betweenness, eigenvector) greater than 
the first quartile, act as broker, and belong to the core of the network have high 
influence over the adaptation governance process. On the other hand, 
organizations that have all three centrality scores less than the fourth quartile, do 
not have any brokerage role, and belong to the periphery of the network have low 
influence. The rest of the organizations have medium influence.    
 
Figure 3.1: Brokerage types in SNA. The node B represents the broker in the 
network as (a) liaison, (b) itinerant, (c) coordinator, (d) gatekeeper, (e) 
representative. (Adapted from Gould & Fernandez 1989) 
 
3.5. Results  
3.5.1. Structural characteristics of multilevel adaptation governance network 
The structural characteristics of multilevel adaptation governance network 
in Bangladesh comprise of horizontal and vertical interactions among the actors 
(Fig. 3.2). The SNA led us to reject our first hypothesis (Table 3.5). I found a 
higher clustering at the national level which indicates a relatively more closed 
network characterized by greater cooperation and collaboration among the 
organizations. The SNA supported the second hypothesis (Table 3.5). The mean 
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degree and betweenness centralities at the national level are greater than the 
subnational level, indicating a dominance of knowledge and resource sharing at 
the national level. At the national level, most of the organizations are well 
connected to each other and interact regularly for planning, implementing, 
monitoring, and evaluating adaptation actions. However, unless their functions 
overlap, these interactions are project-specific. I found that these interactions are 
more formal in nature and follow procedural protocols, while at the sub-national 
level the interactions are relatively less formal. The sub-national level 
organization officials sometimes interact informally and cooperate/collaborate 
without a protocol or paperwork. This discontinuous chain of actions (Verkerk et 
al. 2015) particularly takes place in case of minor confusions or instances of 
assistance. For example, in an adaptation project, sub-district level water 
development and forestry organizations had overlapping jurisdictions and conflict 
began when they started working at the same time. They finally resolved the 
conflict through informal interactions. I think such informal interactions among 
the organizations facilitate the sub-national level governance process rather than 
restrict it. In addition to the formal exchanges of information, these informal 
interactions could strengthen the relationship of trust and respect among them. 
However, other than these instances of ad-hoc informal cooperation, the 
collaboration among the subnational level organizations are often dictated by the 
national level organizations. 
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Table 3.5: Exploratory SNA at the national and sub-national level   
Level Density Mean 
Degree 
Centrality 
Mean 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Global 
Clustering 
Coefficient 
Degree 
centralization 
National 0.120 8.39 35.53 0.386 0.206 
Sub-national 0.150 5.11 9.39 0.299 0.228 
Multilevel 0.140 10.37 56.79 0.362 0.166 
 
 The SNA analysis further found that all organizations that have high 
influence over adaptation governance belong to the national level, and thus 
supports the third hypothesis (Fig. 3.2). These organizations are in the core part of 
the network and have varying roles of brokerage (see Appendix 2). The ministries 
are primarily responsible for coordinating with their associated organizations as 
well as other organizations outside their sectors. Thus, they act as various types of 
brokers in different instances. For example, they act as a gatekeeper or 
representative broker when they connect their associated organizations with other 
ministries. Again, they act as a coordinator broker when they connect two or more 
of their associated organizations that would not interact otherwise. Some 
organizations (e.g. LGED, DAE) under these ministries are responsible for 
leading the adaptation actions and they act as brokers as well. For example, 
national level water development organization acts as a liaison broker by 
connecting a research organization with a development aid agency. Alternatively, 
it can act as an itinerant broker by transferring information from its subnational 
level subsidiary to another subnational level organization of a different sector. 
With high influence over the adaptation governance, these organizations are 
capable of significantly impacting decision making by exerting authority and 
  79 
allowing/restricting information, knowledge, and resource flow. Interestingly, the 
MOEFCC has been treated as a focal ministry for climate change, while I found it 
has medium influence because of its relatively weaker collaborations and 
coordination with other organizations. This was also reflected in the adaptation 
project budget of Bangladesh (2009-15) in which the MOEFCC received less than 
0.20 percent of total budget amount (Rahman & Tosun 2018).  
 
Figure 3.2: Influence of organizations in multilevel adaptation governance 
network. 
 The district level organizations have medium influence over the adaptation 
governance processes. They can affect the governance processes by controlling 
information or knowledge exchange between national and sub-district levels. The 
bureaucratic structure of governance allows them to exercise authority over their 
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sub-district subsidiaries. The sub-district level organizations have medium to low 
influence over the adaptation governance. Although these organizations remain at 
the forefront of adaptation management, their actions are often directed and 
controlled by the district level organizations. Yet, they contain the power to 
influence the information flow between local level and higher levels of 
governance, as they deal with the local beneficiaries.       
 
3.5.2. Multilevel adaptation governance processes 
 In the multi-actor networked polity of adaptation governance in 
Bangladesh, I identified five types of organizations based on their influence, 
functions, and roles: key, funding, bridging, supporting, and frontier organization 
(Fig. 3.3). Key organizations play a lead role in managing the adaptation actions: 
from conceiving the plan to implementing to monitoring and evaluating, and are 
often termed as ‗implementing organizations‘. They are generally associated with 
a ministry and can operate at national and/or subnational level/s of governance. 
Frontier organizations operate at the subnational level and often act as the 
representative of national level organizations to the local stakeholders. In most 
cases, they are the local subsidiaries of the key organizations. Supporting 
organizations contribute to the adaptation management through providing 
information, knowledge, or other forms of resources. They mostly operate at the 
national level of governance and aid in the adaptation project by conducting 
impact assessments, modeling human/environment system, and carrying out 
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research. For instance, BRRI conducts research on flood tolerant rice varieties and 
assists DAE in agricultural adaptation projects.  Bridging organizations primarily 
act as coordination platforms. Operating at national or subnational levels of 
governance, these organizations create a converging space where all involved 
organizations interact together. The Planning Commission under the MOP, as an 
example, arranges project evaluation meetings during adaptation planning where 
all involved organizations meet together and discuss the strengths and weaknesses 
of a project. Funding organizations are responsible for evaluating the adaptation 
budget, allocating the funding sources, and managing the financial aspects of the 
project. They usually operate at the highest level of governance. For example, the 
MOF and the ECNEC (Executive Committee of the National Economic Council, 
the country‘s highest economic policy making body headed by the Prime 
Minister) take the final decision on all government funded adaptation projects. 
Notably, some organizations can belong to two or more types depending on 
adaptation phases or projects. For instance, FD_N can act as both key 
organization and frontier organization at different stages of adaptation project. In 
the following sub-sections, I will portray how power dynamics emerges through 
the interactions of these five types of organizations in three phases of adaptation, 
drawing from how the organizations described their activities and relationships in 
adaptation governance. I classify the phases of adaptation as planning, 
implementation, and monitoring and evaluation (Moser & Ekstrom 2010). 
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Figure 3.3: Organization type and their operation at different levels of governance 
(see Table 3.2 for acronyms) 
 
3.5.2.1. Adaptation Planning  
The climate adaptation planning process begins with the 
conception of an adaptation project usually by a national level key 
organization. Using material resources (i.e. funding) and authority, a key 
organization exercises power over frontier organizations to collect data on 
local priorities. The frontier organizations utilize their ideational resources 
(i.e. information/ knowledge) to shape the objectives of the adaptation 
project. As an illustration, the local level engineering department assists 
the national level offices in preparing an adaptation plan by obtaining 
information on potential significance and locations of disaster shelters. 
However, the exercise of power by frontier organizations is at times 
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influenced by elite perceptions and local politics. A respondent from a 
frontier organization commented: ‗the sub-district administration is like a 
king here and the king knows better what is good for their subjects (i.e. 
local people) than the subject themselves‘. With such elite perceptions, 
these frontier organizations may not always choose to consult with local 
beneficiaries, instead select convenient information to transfer to key 
organizations. Furthermore, local politicians and elite people often 
successfully lobby for selecting their ruling areas for adaptation projects. 
Saha (2017), for instance, found that in the island areas participation of 
vulnerable populations in adaptation planning is curtailed by the close 
connection between local elites/ larger peasant farmers and frontier 
organization officials. 
To buttress this local-level needs assessment, the supporting 
organizations use their ideational resources such as downscaled climate 
projections or impact analysis. In this process, the key organization can 
use structural power and material resources to mobilize the supporting 
organizations. To illustrate, the national level water organization can seek 
a downscaled climate projection from a research organization (i.e. RRI) in 
an adaptation plan on embankments. With these ideational supports from 
the frontier and supporting organizations, the key organizations formulate 
adaptation project proposals. However, in certain instances, by providing 
material resources the funding organizations exert authority over 
supporting organizations, requesting the development of ideational 
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resources through research and innovations. Later, supporting 
organizations can exercise structural power over key organizations to 
formulate new adaptation plans based on their research findings or 
innovations. For instance, Bangladesh‘s national-level agriculture 
organization formulates new plans to distribute BRRI‘s newly invented 
flood-tolerant seed varieties to coastal farmers.  
The national-level bridging organizations use their structural 
power to evaluate the project proposals. Line ministries, for example, 
evaluate a study proposal to examine whether it is aligned with 
Bangladesh‘s Five Year Plan or other long-term plans, and hold the 
authority to recommend a revision or rejection. Also, the Planning 
Commission under the MOP looks into possible redundancies of a project, 
such as overlapping functions or geographical coverage, as well as project 
feasibility, and budgetary requirements. Furthermore, by arranging 
meetings, the bridging organizations create a converging space of 
interactions for all involved organizations. However, these bridging 
organizations often fail to exert enough authority to bring all involved 
stakeholders together, as evidenced by a respondent‘s comment: ‗… even 
many important organizations, such as Ministry of Finance, do not attend 
many project evaluation meetings’. In practice, these bridging 
organizations also do not always exercise their power of approval. For 
example, the Planning Commission does not reject even one percent of the 
proposals they receive because the key and funding organizations 
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informally reach an understanding beforehand. In this way, as a result of 
the power exercised by key and financial organizations, bridging 
organizations are left with little power to wield and often no effective 
means to coordinate among all involved organizations take place.  
In sum, the adaptation planning process in Bangladesh is inclusive 
in nature and ensures participation of all types of organizations, yet the 
contribution of the supporting and bridging organizations are subordinate 
(Fig. 3.4). The key and frontier organizations take leadership by exerting 
their dispositional and structural power. Although the funding 
organizations operate at the highest level of governance, their participation 
in the overall planning process has not been observed much. The fusion of 
top-down process, influenced by authority and material resources, and 
bottom-up process, dominated by authority and ideational resources, 
seems to exemplify a well-crafted adaptation planning, but the minimal 
exercise of power by the bridging and supporting organizations and elite 
perception of frontier organizations are concerning. As a result of the 
subordinate roles of these organizations, their efforts to communicate local 
needs could be undermined and important local knowledge could be 
overlooked in the planning process.   
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Figure 3.4: Power dynamics in adaptation planning process. 
3.5.2.2. Adaptation Implementation 
In the adaptation implementation processes in Bangladesh the key 
organizations mobilize the frontier organizations through exerting 
structural power and providing material support. Both of these 
organizations connect to local stakeholders by arranging workshops, 
trainings, demonstration in an adaptation project. For instance, in 
agricultural sector, Department of Agriculture Extension arranges 
demonstration and training programs to provide newly invented flood-
tolerant seed varieties to the farmers. In contrast, in the water resource or 
infrastructure sector, involvement with local beneficiaries is minimal. In 
this sector, project implementation is outsourced through online bidding 
and the key and frontier organizations are responsible only for supervision 
and monitoring. However, interviewees reported that key and frontier 
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organizations often fail to conduct background checks and involved in 
corruption with the contractors. As such, many contractors take multiple 
projects in overlapping time periods and fail to complete any project in 
time. For example, in 2017, more than 160 thousands of hectares of 
cropland in northeast Bangladesh were inundated by flash floods due to 
incompletion of and corruption in an embankment project.    
These key and frontier organizations can wield structural power 
over the bridging organizations to meet various needs. For example, water 
development board can ask the district administration or the Ministry of 
Land to acquire lands for the purpose of a project. However, the bridging 
organizations can also exert structural powers over key and frontier 
organizations by creating coordination platforms and acting as 
adjudicators. For instance, the district and sub-district administrations 
arrange a bi-monthly coordination meeting which serves as the only 
formal sub-national platform to coordinate among the adaptation 
implementing organizations. This meeting allows the discussion of what 
other organizations require from an organization in implementation and is 
used to resolve confusions, conflicts, misunderstandings among 
organizations, if any.  
Overall, the key organizations hold relatively more dispositional 
and structural power, which makes them the most significant actor in the 
adaptation implementation process. These key organizations mostly 
operate at the national level and the asymmetry denotes a centralized top-
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down governance process, although this might not be readily observable. 
This subtle polarization of power impairs the implementation process as 
the frontier organizations cannot take independent decisions in case of 
emergencies, or if the implementation process requires sudden alteration. 
As an illustration, in an event of embankment breach, the subnational level 
organizations cannot repair the embankment without getting permission 
from national level organizations. While such rigidity facilitates the 
implementation process, the crisis management capacities of these 
organizations remain low. This overall power dynamics is represented in 
Fig. 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5: Power dynamics in adaptation implementation process 
 
3.5.2.3. Adaptation Monitoring and Evaluation 
The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of adaptation progress in 
Bangladesh is conducted at multiple levels of governance primarily with 
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two approaches: onsite and offsite. The onsite approach is a direct form of 
M&E: the organization sends its team to the field site. In contrast, the 
offsite approach follows a hierarchical bureaucratic system of M&E: the 
national level organization collects information from subnational level 
organizations. Through the offsite M&E system, the key organizations 
provide material resources and wield structural power over frontier 
organizations for monitoring and evaluation. As such, by generating 
weekly or bi-weekly progress report, frontier organizations can only use 
ideational resources to exercise power in the process. For instance, the 
sub-district level organizations provide the district level organizations with 
weekly updates on the implementation progress. As unsatisfactory 
progress can lead to financial restrictions and authoritative pressure from 
higher level organizations, it is probable that the frontier organizations can 
cherry-pick the positive information. Notably, whether an adaptation 
project progress is ‗satisfactory‘ is determined primarily by frontier 
organizations or district level key organizations. As such, by allowing or 
restricting progress information they conserve more power than others. 
Their report hierarchically goes upward to funding organizations. Because 
the offsite M&E follows a bureaucratic bottom-up process, the higher 
level organizations always hold the structural power to penalize the 
hierarchically subordinate organizations, if adaptation progress is 
unsatisfactory. For instance, if the progress is not satisfactory, the 
Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED), under the 
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MOP, takes various steps ranging from notifying the key organizations to 
restricting the fund disbursement for the next financial year.  
Under the onsite M&E system, key and funding organizations use 
their material resources (i.e. inspection teams) to obtain progress 
information. In addition, they sometimes use citizen science to collect 
information. The World Bank, for example, gives away $100 phones to 
the highly respected community people in the adaptation project areas as a 
part of the M&E process so that these people can contribute in monitoring 
by sending pictures and short messages. However, the key and funding 
organizations cannot take an onsite M&E approach for all projects because 
of human resource constraints. For instance, IMED randomly selects 10 
projects in a financial year to conduct onsite M&E and for the rest they 
rely on offsite M&E. Such overreliance on the offsite approach provides 
the frontier organizations with more power to wield in the M&E process.  
Overall, the exercise of power in the adaptation M&E process in 
Bangladesh is dominated by the use of ideational sources of power and the 
exercise of authority (Fig. 3.6). Although the combination of both onsite 
and offsite approaches appears to enhance the efficiency of the adaptation 
M&E process, the offsite approach remains dominant in the M&E process. 
Because of the reliance on offsite M&E approach, the participation of 
local stakeholders is limited and ensured mostly through the frontier 
organizations. Furthermore, the supporting organizations are kept outside 
the M&E process. As these organizations conduct research on climate 
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change impacts, without their participation in the M&E process the 
information on effectiveness of adaptation actions may remain incomplete. 
I think that such exclusion of local stakeholders and supporting 
organizations may mar the success of adaptation. 
 
Figure 3.6: Power dynamics in adaptation monitoring and evaluation 
process 
 
3.6. Discussion 
All adaptation takes place in political context where actors struggle, contest, and 
negotiate to meet their interests (Eriksen et al. 2015). The first step of addressing the 
power dynamics in adaptation governance processes is to understanding how power is 
being unfolded through the interactions among the actors (Bulkeley 2012, Nightingale 
2017). Power asymmetries will always exist among actors in governance; while complete 
parity in participation and decision-making influence is unlikely and perhaps undesirable, 
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it is important to make visible the nature of inequality and evaluate how it affects 
decision processes and outcomes. Attention to power, authority and decision-making is 
particularly important in adaptation given that the outcomes of adaptation governance are 
unlikely to be sustainable if they do not address the needs of the most vulnerable (Eriksen 
et al. 2011). The wide range of power inequalities in multilevel adaptation governance in 
Bangladesh lie within the bureaucratic structure of governance (Rahman & Tosun 2018).  
The adaptation governance structure and processes in Bangladesh indicate a 
relatively centralized governance system and thus support H4. The power of decision-
making is variably dispersed at multiple levels of governance, but a small number of 
national level actors are dominant in the adaptation process. The governance includes 
both top-down and bottom-up processes at different phases of adaptation, yet the key 
decision-making power rests with the some national level actors. Evidence across the 
world suggests that such relative centralization of adaptation governance is Janus-faced. 
On one hand, it can facilitate better coordination and as a result prevent overlapping 
authorities, conflicting responsibilities, and duplicating functions (Termeer et al. 2010, 
Gillard et al. 2017). For example, in England, national government-driven top-down 
structure of adaptation governance mobilized actors at different levels without any 
significant duplicity or conflict in adaptation actions (Tompkins et al. 2010). On the other 
hand, it might prohibit experimental learning, trust building, collaborative management 
and disregards local priorities and context sensitivities (Ostrom 2010, Jordan et al. 2015). 
For instance, a centralized adaptation planning system in Western Norway limits 
stakeholder collaboration and fails to make adaptation a salient issue at local level 
(Dannevig & Aall 2015). Empirical and experimental evidence support that the 
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disadvantages of such centralization outweigh its advantages (i.e. Cole 2015, Ojha et al. 
2015, Nightingale 2017, Sova et al. 2017). I found similar scenario in Bangladesh as 
well. 
The structure of multilevel adaptation governance in Bangladesh gives abundant 
authority to the national level key organizations in all phases of adaptation process. The 
bridging and supporting organizations, on the other hand, wield relatively little power. 
Despite actively participating in different phases of adaptation, the frontier organizations 
mostly follow orders or instructions and have few opportunities to initiate new ventures. 
This relative centralization of power falls between the elite-centered and pluralistic 
orientations. In an elite-centered structure, a small subset of actors holds most power and 
exerts disproportionate influence on governance (Mills 1956, Dahl 1958), while in a 
pluralistic structure, power is distributed among various groups in the society with some 
groups have more influence than others on certain issues. While in the Global South, 
climate adaptation governance is often elite-centered (i.e. Ojha et al. 2015, Vedeld et al. 
2016, Sova et al. 2017), I think in Bangladesh, climate adaptation governance is similar 
to elite pluralism- in which power is dispersed among several actors, yet a few actors 
contain more power than others (Dahl 1982). In an elite pluralistic governance milieu, as 
demonstrated in Indonesia (Di Gregorio et al. 2019), Lesotho (Bisaro et al. 2010), and in 
our case, power is variably distributed among multiple levels of governance but some 
national level organizations, in most cases the sectoral leading organizations, influence 
the overall adaptation governance process the most. 
The elite pluralistic nature of adaptation governance in Bangladesh can have 
serious implications. First, due to the powering of key organizations and elite-perceptions 
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of frontier organizations, sufficient participation of community people in determining 
local vulnerabilities and prioritizing adaptation actions might not be ensured and the 
adaptive capacity of local communities may remain unaddressed in national interventions 
(Khan & Rahman 2007). Second, integration of local or indigenous knowledge in 
adaptation planning is likely to be limited because of insignificant participation of local 
people through the frontier organizations (Haque et al. 2015). In the recent past, a 
disregard of indigenous knowledge (i.e. Tidal River Management) in flood management 
brought disastrous impacts in southwest Bangladesh. Flood prevention measures (i.e. 
sluice gate, embankment) ultimately created long-term water logging in many regions 
(see Islam & Kibria 2006, Ishtiaque et al. 2017). Third, the emergency management 
capacity of frontier organizations is also likely to be low because of the relative 
centralization of power. For instance, I found that in an event of embankment breached 
flooding, it takes at least two weeks to repair the embankment because frontier 
organizations lack power to act independently of central organizations. Similarly, in 
central Mexico, centralization of water resource management impedes proactive decision-
making by municipal actors to release dam water to prevent flooding (Eakin et al. 2010). 
Fourth, it is likely that the success of any adaptation will not be disseminated because the 
supporting organizations participate only in adaptation planning. The evaluation of 
success requires more than mere information on physical progress of the adaptation 
actions but rather consideration of how adaptations are addressing the local socio-
ecological complexities, feedbacks, and future changes (Adger et al. 2005, Eriksen et al. 
2011, Fazey et al. 2016). This form of assessment may be best conducted by supporting 
organizations with research capacities. Lastly, the bridging organizations may not play an 
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effective role as adjudicators or evaluators. For example, the district administration often 
fails to resolve the conflict between engineering department and water board over 
overlapping jurisdictions, and line ministries of respective organizations need to 
intervene. In the case of the Planning Commission, adaptation project evaluation 
becomes a mere formality. Less than one percent of planning proposals submitted to them 
are rejected.     
To alter the elite-pluralistic nature of adaptation governance and build a more 
collaborative, pluralistic environment, Bangladesh government has to address at least two 
issues: power dispersion to certain organizations and creation of an operating space for 
collaboration and coordination. The frontier organizations should be given more 
dispositional and structural power to manage emergency situations and the supporting 
organizations should have the power to independently evaluate the adaptation progress 
and outcome. The capacities of these organizations need to be enhanced as well to wield 
the given power. Also, the government needs to create an operating space where 
stakeholders can continuously interact. Unlike a coordination platform, interactions in the 
operating space will not require existence of a bridging organization instead the 
stakeholders can directly communicate with each other. In this way, an operating space 
for collaboration and coordination would facilitate trust building among stakeholders and 
prevent elite-capture. For example, elite-capture by the local influential people and 
frontier organizations in an aquaculture system in Bangladesh, the funding organization 
mobilized the key and frontier organizations and local stakeholders to increase 
representation and accountability, and thus effectively stopped elite-capture (Ratner et al. 
2013).   
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3.7. Conclusion 
This research analyzes the structure and processes of the multilevel adaptation 
governance network in Bangladesh. I adopted social network analysis approach to 
understand the structural characteristics and the concept of power to analyze the power 
dynamics among the organizations in the MLG processes. I identified that a few national 
level organizations have higher influence over the governance process than the sub-
national level organizations. I further found that adaptation governance in Bangladesh is 
elite pluralistic in nature, as demonstrated as a relative centralization of power at the 
national level. The relative centralization of power may cause persistence of 
organizational conflicts, low local level organizational capacity, and disconnect with 
local beneficiaries. I think a more equitable redistribution of power and emphasis on 
coordination/collaboration will have a positive effect on the adaptation governance 
process, but at the same time we need more evidential research on the effect of power 
dynamics on adaptation outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MECHANISM-BASED ANALYSIS OF BARRIERS TO ADAPTATION 
GOVERNANCE 
4.1. Introduction 
The multidimensional nature and cross-scale impacts of climate change require a 
concerted effort from different actors operating at multiple levels of governance to adapt 
to changes (Gibson 2000, Cash & Moser 2000, Cash et al. 2006, Termeer et al. 2010). 
Through continuous or instance-based interactions, these actors often form a multilevel 
network of governance to manage the adaptation actions (Bulkeley & Moser 2007, 
Keskitalo 2010, Bauer et al. 2012). Multilevel governance to adaptation to climate 
change is characterized by the ambitions, preferences, responsibilities, and resources of 
the actors (Ford et al. 2013, Termeer et al. 2013, Vink et al. 2013) and, because of 
discrepancies in these attributes among actors, numerous challenges may surface in the 
process of interactions, impairing the adaptation governance process (Amundsen et al. 
2010, Juhola 2016). These challenges are popularly known as barriers to adaptation. 
Synonymously termed as ‗hindrances‘ or ‗constraints‘ or ‗impasses‘ in the literature, 
barriers can generally be defined as obstacles or challenges that can impede the 
governance process of planning, implementing, and monitoring the adaptation actions 
(Moser & Ekstrom 2010, Jones & Boyd 2011, Eisenack et al. 2014).  
Research on barriers in adaptation literature is quite new but already prevalent 
(for a detailed list of literature, see Moser & Ekstrom 2010, Biesbroek et al. 2013, 
Eisenack et al. 2014). Collectively, the objectives of this body of research has tended to 
emphasize a need to inventory the range of barriers at play, with broad, if not vague, 
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suggestions on how to overcome them (Biesbroek et al. 2014). Although these studies are 
useful as starting points in documenting what type of barriers might emerge at different 
phases of the adaptation process, they are often not useful enough to understand how or 
why they emerge in the first place. Without an understanding of the processes that cause 
the emergence of the barriers, a mere listing of barriers reduces complex and highly 
dynamic decision making into simplified, static, and metaphorical statements about why 
current outcomes are ‗incorrect‘ (Biesbroek et al. 2015). Furthermore, unless what causes 
the barriers to emerge in the governance process is known, addressing or overcoming the 
barriers may become hard. As such, several researchers encouraged to abandon the so 
called ‗barrier approach‘ and instead examine the underlying mechanisms that are 
involved in the emergence of barriers in the adaptation governance process (Biesbroek et 
al. 2014, 2015, Wellstead et al. 2018). 
Mechanism-based explanation is not uncommon in social science disciplines 
(Norkus 2005, Hedström & Ylikoski 2010). Scholars used this approach to understand 
what processes are involved that produce a certain outcome of interest. For instance, if X 
(variable/factor) produces Y (outcome), a mechanism-based analysis would go beyond 
investigating the correlation and examine the causation instead: how or why X produces 
Y. Introducing this approach of analysis in barriers to adaptation research, Biesbroek et 
al. (2014) identified three mechanisms that caused barriers in an adaptation project in the 
Netherlands. In a similar venture, Sieber et al. (2018) explained six mechanisms in five 
ecosystem-based adaptation cases in Thailand and the Netherlands. While these 
mechanism-based analyses help us to understand why, and under what context, these 
barriers come into play, more evidence from different adaptation contexts are required to 
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have a better understanding on the variety of mechanisms and to devise adaptation 
strategies considering those mechanisms (Biesbroek et al. 2014, Sieber et al. 2018).   
In this study, we seek to analyze the underlying mechanisms that cause the 
barriers to emerge in the adaptation governance process in Bangladesh by asking the 
following question: What are the mechanisms that can explain the emergence of barriers 
in the adaptation governance process in Bangladesh? Because of increased risk of 
flooding due to climate change, we limit ourselves only to the barriers to adaptation in 
flood management sector. We drew from key-informant interview data, and utilized 
systematic literature review and content analysis techniques to conduct this research. By 
analyzing the mechanisms involved in barriers to adaptation governance in Bangladesh, 
this research aims to contribute to understanding of adaptation governance barriers in two 
ways. First, it intends to provide mechanism-based evidence for adaptation to flood 
context which will be useful not only to the decision-makers in Bangladesh but also to 
others interested in Global South or flood hazard contexts. Second, this research adopts 
an approach to analysis that is novel in barriers to adaptation literature. This approach of 
analysis will help in considering multiple cases together and to provide a more general 
statement about the mechanisms. 
 
4.2. Conceptual background   
The definition of ‗mechanism‘ is heavily debated by social scientists. A list of 
definitions assembled by Mahoney (2001) represented 24 different definitions of 
mechanisms by 21 authors. With these definitions the ‗mechanism‘ term could be applied 
to explicate a variety of phenomena ranging from cognitive processes, such as rational 
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choice, to societal change processes, such as French Revolution (Mayntz 2004). Some of 
these definitions view a mechanism as a variable(s) that explains why a correlation exists 
between two other variables (i.e. Hedström & Swedberg 1998), while some view it as a 
mid-level theory that is recurrent and easily recognizable (i.e. Elster 1998). However, 
these definitions fail to go beyond assumptions of correlation and typically do not take 
isolated or unobserved phenomena that could come into play in causal effects into 
account (Mahoney 2001). For instance, by defining mechanisms as ‗frequently occurring 
and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown 
conditions or with indeterminate consequences‖, Elster (1998) asserted the correlational 
assumptions. Going beyond this correlational approach, in our study, mechanisms are 
defined as unobserved but empirically traceable processes that act as causes in generating 
the outcome of interest and explain how and/or why one thing leads to another (Mahoney 
2001, Anderson et al. 2006, Biesbroek et al. 2017). As per this definition, mechanisms 
are posited relations or processes that when they operate, they produce an outcome of 
interest. This definition indicates that mechanism can exist in dormancy, but in favorable 
context it can be triggered and generate an outcome of interest (Mahoney 2001).   
Although it is arguable, many suggest that mechanism-based analysis requires 
consideration of initial context (Hedström & Swedberg 1998, Pawson 2000, Mahoney 
2001, Falleti & Lynch 2009). Contexts or initial conditions are important as they allow us 
to understand under which conditions some mechanisms are initiated and produce certain 
outcomes (Pawson 2013). Conceiving a mechanism as a link between cause (or input) 
and effect (or outcome), Hedström & Swedberg (1996) introduced the I–M–O model. The 
mechanism M explains the processes that leads the initial conditions I to produce the 
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observable outcome O. This model explains how mechanisms can cause (un)intended 
outcomes, but lacks the diagnosis of mechanism itself.  
A variety of frameworks have been developed to analyze mechanisms. In this 
study, we used the widely adopted macro-micro-micro model, or popularly known as the 
‗bathtub‘ model, to diagnose mechanisms involved in adaptation governance. This model 
frames mechanisms as nested, multilevel phenomena. Developed by Coleman (1990) this 
model stipulates that mechanism must be understood by investigating how macro level 
phenomena (i.e. social norms) influence micro level phenomena (i.e. individual behavior) 
that generate another micro level phenomena (i.e. individual action) and ultimately affect 
the macro level phenomena (i.e. structure of social network). Hedström & Swedberg 
(1998) classified these macro-micro, micro-micro, and micro-macro linkages into three 
types: situational, action-formation, and transformational mechanisms. Situational 
mechanisms explain the influence of macro forces on more micro level phenomena. For 
instance, cultural norms, governance structure, practices influence the policy, perception, 
opportunities of organizations. Action-formation mechanisms operate solely at micro 
level and link cognition to behavior. For instance, the policy and perception of 
organizations may dictate how they will interact or act. Transformational mechanisms 
specify how micro level factors affect macro level. For example, the interactions among 
organizations may lead to unintended outcomes like barriers. The macro-micro-micro 
model can be nested within the mechanism part of the I-M-O model, but at the same time, 
the I-M-O model can be applied separately to all three mechanisms of the macro-micro-
micro model (Mayntz 2004). In this study, we conceptualized the macro-micro-micro 
model nested within the mechanism part of I-M-O model (see Fig. 4.1). 
  102 
 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual framework for mechanism-based analysis. I-M-O model 
represents initial condition or context (I), mechanism (M), and outcome (O). The so-
called bathtub model is nested within mechanism (M). 
 
Examining all these three types of mechanisms of macro-micro-micro model in a 
single study is exhausting and may prevent in-depth analysis (Anderson et al. 2006). As 
such, in this study, we will examine action-formation mechanisms only. We are 
interested in analyzing action-formation mechanisms because they elucidate why 
organizations (inter)act the way they (inter)act. In this mechanism framework, our 
context or initial condition (I) is defined by organizational interactions in the governance 
of adaptation, and the outcome (O) we analyze is the barrier to such interactions. We thus 
examine the action-formation mechanisms: the mechanisms that form organizational 
actions that then cause the emergence of barriers. Notably, the purpose of this research is 
not to invent or define new mechanisms, but instead to explain the emergence of barriers 
by associating this emergence with mechanisms that have already been identified in the 
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literature. A thorough review of literature from sociology, political science, and climate 
change adaptation identified these action-formation mechanisms (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Examples of action-formation mechanisms gathered from literature 
Mechanisms Definition 
Belief-formation It states that the numbers of individuals who perform a 
certain act signal to others the likely value or necessity of the act, 
and this signal will influence other individuals' choice of action 
(Hedstrom & Swedberg 1996). 
Organizational inertia It is the tendency of a mature organization to continue on its 
current trajectory (Gilbert 2005). This inertia can be described as 
being made up of two elements -- resource rigidity and routine 
rigidity. Resource rigidity stems from an unwillingness to invest, 
while routine rigidity stems from an inability to change the 
patterns and logic that underlie those investments. Resource 
rigidity relates to the motivation to respond, routine rigidity to the 
structure of that response. 
Power dynamics (boundary 
control) 
It takes place when some actors want to keep its resources, 
abilities, or conflicts localized and strictly limit access to these 
(Gibson 2005). Boundary control mechanism can be observed in 
an authoritarian system or in a milieu where trust is lacking 
(Felleti & Lynch 2009). 
Power dynamics 
(enclosure/exclusion) 
Enclosure and exclusion mechanisms are representations of power 
dynamics among the actors. Enclosure means capturing resources 
and authority and exclusion indicates marginalizing stakeholders 
(Sovacool et al. 2015). Enclosure happens when authority and/or 
resources are transferred to a few influential private actors. 
Exclusion takes place in tandem with enclosure and it dismisses 
the participation of particular groups of stakeholders in the 
adaptation process. 
Frame Polarization It is an interactive process through which the distance between the 
perspectives of two or more opposing groups increases over time 
due to repeated reaffirmation of the same point by the actors 
involved (Dewulf and Bouwen 2012). 
Veto player  It is the influence of one actor in this case resembles the veto 
player theory. Veto players can block decision-making processes 
based on powerful resources that they own and for reasons not 
always made transparently clear (Klijn 2003). 
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4.3. Methods  
4.3.1. Study context 
In this study, we selected Bangladesh as a case study area because 
Bangladesh is historically involved in adaptation to flooding. Due to climate 
change, the risk of flooding increased in recent years (Mirza et al. 2003, Karim & 
Mimura 2008). As the country lies in the intersection of Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna river system, one of highest discharged rivers in the world, flooding is a 
recurrent phenomenon here. Floods in Bangladesh can be categorized into four 
types: flash, riverine, rainwater, and coastal flood. Although Bangladesh 
encounters flooding every other year, climate change will increase the frequency 
and intensity of flooding in coming years (Mohammed et al. 2018). In order to 
deal with the risk, the government of Bangladesh mobilized a number of 
organizations in different sectors of engagement (i.e. infrastructure, water 
resource, forestry, socio-economy). These organizations work in a variety of 
ways, such as the water development board constructs embankments, the forest 
department creates green belts, or department of public health provides sanitation 
facilities. These organizations interact with each other as well as with local and 
national stakeholders to manage adaptation actions (Ishtiaque et al. 2019).  
Several barriers have emerged through the interactions of the stakeholders 
in the governance process (Bhuiyan 2015, Ahmed et al. 2015, Zevenbergen et al. 
2018). For example, lack of participation of local stakeholders has been identified 
as a barrier by many (Sovacool et al. 2012, Stott & Huq 2014, Bhuiyan 2015). As 
with the broader literature on barriers in adaptation, the barrier-related research in 
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Bangladesh has largely focused on assessing which barriers are present; how or 
why these barriers emerge remains largely unexplored. Nevertheless, to address 
barriers appropriately, the underlying factors that give rise to them need to be 
addressed. 
 
4.3.2. Key- informant interviews 
Through an online search and snowball sampling procedure, we identified 
the organizations associated with adaptation governance process and selected lead 
organizations in five key sectors of engagement: water resource, infrastructure, 
socio-economy, forestry, and agriculture. The lead organizations were selected 
based on their work scope and reputation. In total, we selected 17 organizations 
that included both government and non-government entities. These organizations 
operate at national, district, and sub-district levels of governance. We prepared a 
semi-structured questionnaire that included questions designed to elicit 
respondents‘ ideas about the challenges that impair the adaptation governance 
process: how these challenges become important in the process, why these 
challenges keep occurring, and how they impair the governance process. Each 
interview lasted approximately for an hour. These key-informant interviews 
enabled us to examine the emergence of barriers in the interactions among the 
actors directly involved in the adaptation governance process. The interview 
questionnaire was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Arizona State 
University. These interviews were later transcribed and coded according to the 
categories of mechanisms reported in the literature.  
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4.3.3. Evidence synthesis 
The key-informant interviews were regionally limited to central coastal 
Bangladesh because of time and resource constraints; however, risk of flooding 
exists in other parts of the country as well. As such, we relied on published 
empirical studies to collect data on barrier emergence. This approach would allow 
us to consider existing studies on barriers to adaptation, most of which took a 
barrier approach. We argue that without completely abandoning this rich breadth 
of knowledge as suggested by Biesbroek et al. (2017), we can sort out the useful 
ones. For this reason, in order to obtain further information on the mechanisms 
associated with the emergence of barriers in the interactions among organizations 
and local stakeholders in Bangladesh, we conducted a systematic literature review 
(SLR). We adopted the ROSES (RepOrting standards for Systematic Evidence 
Synthesis in environmental research) protocol in the SLR process. We included 
only peer-reviewed journal articles in English that were published in the period of 
1990-2019, and, given the large amount of literature on adaptation in Bangladesh, 
we limited our regional focus to Bangladesh.  
Climate change adaptation is relatively a new policy paradigm in 
Bangladesh. Vij et al. (2018) found that Bangladesh has implemented climate 
policy in four periods since the mid-1990s: i) natural disaster vulnerability and 
disaster response (1997-present); ii) disaster risk reduction (2003- present); iii) 
climate change adaptation (2008-present); and iv) mainstreaming climate change 
adaptation (2011-present). Considering the changes in climate policy over this 
time span, we did not limit ourselves just to ―climate adaptation‖ as the 
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organizing concept of the systematic review process. Instead, we included the 
disaster risk reduction and disaster vulnerability-related key words in the search 
process as well, assuming that the same mechanisms that would impede 
adaptation might be present in other phases of the country‘s approach to 
vulnerability and risk in flooding. This inclusion of search key-words would also 
allow us to sample from a larger set of literature. We began our search process 
using different combinations of keywords, such as climate change, adaptation, 
barriers, challenges, governance etc., in the Web of Science platform (see 
Appendix D). These keywords were selected based on the authors‘ prior 
knowledge and experience. The initial search retrieved 424 articles. We reviewed 
these articles based on exclusion and inclusion criteria (Table 4.2). These criteria 
were established to ultimately ensure the selection of articles which provide 
contexts and examples in addition to discussion on barriers. With this three-step 
review process we selected eight articles for final analysis (Table 4.3). We 
analyzed these articles and coded them to identify the barriers and their immediate 
causes (mechanisms) of occurrence. These articles were coded same as interview 
data. 
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Table 4.2: Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Process Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria Accepted Rejected 
Step 1: Title & 
Abstract 
Screening 
Title or Abstract of the 
article must include topic 
related to adaptation/ 
disaster management/ 
vulnerability/ resilience in 
flood management sector. 
Abstract further includes 
discussion of adaptation 
governance or barriers or 
challenges or constraints.  
Title or abstract of the 
article include topic related 
to climate adaptation, 
disaster management, 
vulnerability or resilience 
but the abstract does not 
contain any discussion of 
adaptation governance or 
barriers or challenges or 
constraints. 
38 386 
Step 2: Article 
Screening 
(Full text 
review) 
Article identifies barriers 
or challenges of adaptation 
governance or management 
and explains the barriers 
with examples or attempts 
to provide causes.*  
Article may list out the 
barriers but fails to provide 
examples or causes and 
does not make an attempt 
to explain in details.  
21 17 
Step 3: Article 
Screening 
(Critical 
appraisal & 
synthesis) 
Article attempts addresses 
the causal mechanisms of 
the emergence of barriers 
through a detailed 
discussion on how barriers 
are emerging.  
Article might explain the 
barriers with examples but 
does not analyze the 
underlying causes or article 
that is not 
methodologically robust. 
08 13 
    *These articles will be considered for identifying the barriers but will not be further taken for analysis. 
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Barriers in adaptation governance process 
Out of 424 initially selected articles, we found that only 21 articles (~5% of total 
articles) discussed the barriers with some examples of how they hinder the 
governance process. Of these 21 articles, only eight articles (~2% of total article) 
attempted to analyze how these barriers emerged through interactions among the 
actors. Notably, not all of these eight articles examined the causal mechanisms to 
a great extent. However, none of these articles adopted a mechanism-based 
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approach; instead, they took a barrier approach, which entailed identifying some 
barriers with detailed examples of how these barriers emerge. With these 
examples and descriptions, these articles were able to provide enough details from 
which we could derive instances of interactions, and the challenges that appeared 
and hindered the governance process. 
We first coded for the immediate causes that generate the barriers. Later, 
using the list of mechanism that we identified from literature (see Table 4.1), we 
analyzed which mechanisms could explain the identified barriers and associated 
causes. For instance, Islam & Welkarden (2017) identified ‗limited participation 
of local people‘ as a barrier in adaptation governance. From their examples, we 
identified the potential cause as ‗elite capture of governance process‘ and, by 
inference, we found that ‗power dynamics (enclosure/exclusion)‘ mechanism best 
explained the emergence of this specific instance of a barrier. Notably, some 
barriers can have multiple mechanisms involved. For instance, ‗corruption‘ was 
identified by several studies as a barrier, but, as we describe in detail below, the 
associated mechanism depended on the context in which this barrier was 
observed. The following table summarizes the core information we gather from 
these articles (Table 4.3). Note that in addition to the mechanisms identified in the 
conceptual literature, we identified another mechanism from our interview 
analysis: organizational inertia. The mechanisms are detailed in the following 
subsection. 
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Table 4.3: Summary information on barriers from the finally selected articles 
Reference Identified barriers Mechanisms* 
Stott & Huq 
(2014) 
- Access to information 
- Personal network based 
communication 
- Poor coordination at local level 
- Belief formation 
- Power dynamics 
(enclosure/exclusion) 
- Power dynamics (boundary 
control) 
Bhuiyan (2015) - Limited participation of local 
people 
- Corruption 
- Power dynamics 
(enclosure/exclusion) 
- Belief formation 
Chowdhury & 
Haque (2016) 
- Dominance of rural elites 
- Corruption 
- Power dynamics 
(enclosure/exclusion) 
 
Haque et al. 
(2017) 
- Limited participation of local 
people 
- Power dynamics 
(enclosure/exclusion) 
 
Rahman & 
Giessen (2017) 
- Personal network based 
communication 
- Belief formation 
Islam & 
Welkarden 
(2017) 
- Limited participation of local 
people 
- Poor coordination at local level 
- Corruption 
- Power dynamics 
(enclosure/exclusion) 
 
Rahman & Tosun 
(2018) 
- Struggle for authority among 
organizations 
- Corruption 
- Power dynamics 
(enclosure/exclusion) 
 
Rahman (2018) - Corruption - Power dynamics 
(enclosure/exclusion) 
*These mechanisms have been identified by the researchers of this study. The explanations of 
these mechanisms are available in the next subsection.  
 
4.4.2. Mechanisms of the emergence of barriers to adaptation 
4.4.2.1. Belief formation  
 Belief formation mechanism enables actors to positively value the 
judgment of others and thus induces trust building and concerted efforts. 
This mechanism is at the core of building rapport and as a mechanism 
itself it has its benefits and disadvantages. In case of Bangladesh, belief 
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formation mechanism is responsible for causing emergence of several 
barriers. This mechanism assists us in explaining the barriers ‗personal 
network based communication‘ and ‗corruption‘ identified by three of the 
eight articles. Existing literature suggests that the success of adaptation 
efforts in Bangladesh largely depends on the personal network of the 
organizational high officials (Rahman & Giessen 2017). These adaptation 
projects often involve multiple stakeholders that require good management 
and collaboration skills of the project directors as well as of the high 
officials from other organizations. The nature and frequency of their 
interactions often relies on the trust among these officials. While the belief 
formation mechanism helps to build trust among organizations, it can also 
lead to inefficiency in organizational abilities. Our interview analysis 
reveals that the transfer or quitting of an organization‘s high official can 
cut off or weaken the ties with other organizations that he or she 
established during his/her tenure. For instance, we found that in a climate 
resilient infrastructure project, the collaboration between local government 
engineering department (LGED) and water development board (BWDB) 
weakened significantly when the district level head of BWDB was 
transferred. The new head lacked cooperative mindset and did not act fast 
enough to prevent delays in collaborative efforts. The interviewee said: 
―We had great collaborations with BWDB when Mr. X was the project 
director. After he was transferred, our collaboration stopped as the new 
director was not welcoming to collaborative efforts.‖ From this example, 
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we posit that the belief formation mechanism (M), during the interactions 
among organizations (I), leads to personal network based communication 
(O) and that this form of communication can then lead to administrative 
delays in the governance process (O).  
Belief formation is also critical for non-government organizations 
(NGOs) in order to acquire funding, information, and other support for 
their organizations (Stott & Huq 2014). Through investing resources, these 
NGOs attempt to build trust and rapport with officials from funding 
organizations or with decision-makers and politicians. However, building 
trust for collaboration should not be considered a barrier unless it leads to 
corruption. Transparency International Bangladesh (2013) found that due 
to political rapport, the ruling Awami League government appointed 
PKSF NGO, an organization that has no experience in climate change 
adaptation related works, to make decisions on climate change funding 
distribution. Furthermore, a number of NGOs that have no prior 
experience in climate change related works were funded with Bangladesh 
Climate Change Trust Fund money allegedly because the owners or 
executive directors of those NGOs had well-established connections with 
the ruling party (Bhuiyan 2015). In this way, belief formation mechanism, 
which individually has no negative normative connotations, can lead to the 
emergence of barriers in adaptation governance. 
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4.4.2.2. Power dynamics (enclosure & exclusion) 
The enclosure mechanism represents how power and resources are 
grasped only by a few entities in a governance process, while the 
exclusion mechanism indicates how powering of certain actors dismisses 
the participation of others in the governance process. Our SLR review 
reveals that five out of eight selected articles identified barriers that could 
be explained by these mechanisms, such as limited participation, 
dominance of elites, and poor coordination. In the adaptation efforts in 
Bangladesh, enclosure and exclusion most often take place together. From 
our interview analysis we found that the social elites are often successful 
in lobbying to locate the disaster shelters close to their residences and 
utilize the public sluice gates, constructed for irrigation purposes, for their 
personal gains. These elites use their power of influence and political 
connections to have control over the governance process. Also, the 
organization officials demonstrate elite perceptions that induce enclosure 
and exclusion. For instance, in our interview, the sub-administration told: 
―The sub-district administration is like a king here and the king knows 
better what is good for their subjects (i.e. local people) than the subject 
themselves‖. The empirical literature also demonstrated similar instances 
of power dynamics. Islam & Walkerden (2017) and Rahman & Tosun 
(2018) found that local organization officials often act as accomplices of 
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social elites to appropriate resources and marginalize the vulnerable 
groups.  
Our interviews also found that through the exclusion mechanism 
the organizations and social elites limit the participation of local people in 
adaptation governance. As such, voice of marginalized vulnerable people 
can come only through public protests (Nowreen et al. 2014). For 
example, the river embankments in northeastern part of Bangladesh 
addressed flooding issue to some extent but met with public protest as its 
implications included displacement of local communities, increased river 
erosion, negative impacts on local fisheries, waterlogging in certain areas 
(Haque et al. 2017). Furthermore, our interview reveals that earthen 
embankments in the coastal areas are often constructed without sufficient 
consultation with local beneficiaries and as such cannot make them a part 
of the adaptation process. Feeling their demands have not been met, some 
villagers cut hole into the embankments to supply irrigation water or steal 
soil to elevate their homestead lands. Indeed, these local people need to be 
aware about the significance of embankments, but the exclusion 
mechanism prohibits social awareness. Exclusion mechanism is triggered 
even at national level policy making. The policy formulation process often 
disregards the participation of vulnerable or marginalized groups for 
whom the adaptation actions are planned. For instance, with the assistance 
from national level experts, the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and 
Action Plan was developed and instituted within just six months but 
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without sufficient consideration of local complexities (Raihan et al. 2010). 
In this way, power dynamics (enclosure & exclusion) mechanism becomes 
an important action-formation mechanism that leads to barriers related to 
inequality and discrimination.   
 
4.4.2.3. Power dynamics (boundary control) 
The boundary control mechanism, which entails organizations 
limiting access to specific resources that they control, explains another 
form of power dynamics among the organizations. Of the eight selected 
articles, one article identified ‗limited access to information‘ or 
‗downscaled information unavailability‘ as barrier that can be explained 
by this mechanism. Through our interview analysis and literature review 
we found that downscaled knowledge development is nationally 
centralized and exclusive. It is conceived as an asset or a product by some 
research organizations and is not widely shared (Zevenbergen et al. 2018).  
Local stakeholders as well as NGOs rarely can obtain downscaled 
information that has been produced by national level government-funded 
or owned organizations (Stott & Huq 2014). By holding information and 
limiting access to it, these research organizations wield power over other 
actors and impair the adaptation governance process.  
The boundary control mechanism is also observable in the 
interactions among government organizations. Our interview analysis 
reveals that some organizations are dominant in the adaptation governance 
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process and instead of collaborating with other relevant organizations they 
attempt to operate in every aspect of the adaptation action. For instance, in 
one project, Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) was 
responsible for constructing climate resilient infrastructures and the Forest 
Department was supposed to afforest the remaining project lands. 
However, instead of taking assistance from the Forest Department, the 
LGED afforested the lands by themselves and with a higher cost. Through 
boundary control mechanism, LGED attempts to be an independent 
organization, a one stop solution in order to gather foreign funds. In this 
way, some organizations use the boundary control mechanism to limit 
information access and curtail collaborative efforts, and thus impair 
adaptation actions. 
 
4.4.2.4. Organizational inertia 
Organizational inertia indicates how organizations demonstrate 
unwillingness to invest in new ventures or to change patterns of work. Our 
interview analysis found that several organizations in Bangladesh do not 
have any contingency plan or emergency preparedness for adaptation. For 
instance, in an event of embankment breach, Bangladesh Water 
Development Board (BWDB) takes at least 2-3 weeks to start repairing 
because of not having an emergency preparedness plan. Although 
embankment breach is a common phenomenon, due to organizational 
inertia BWDB is disinclined to invest resources for emergency 
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management. To make the situation worse, they do not even allow other 
organizations to assist in repairing the embankments. During the 
interview, the sub-district administration representative expressed 
frustration that, despite having resources, the administration cannot repair 
the breached part of the embankment and their support is limited only to 
providing emergency relief to the affected people. We also observed that 
the organizational inertia mechanism prohibits the Forest Department to 
come up with novel ideas to lease or own coastal lands for afforestation. 
Traditionally this organization afforests the newly formed islands in the 
coastal areas and due to organizational inertia they cannot act coherently 
with the government‘s plan of establishing a contiguous green belt along 
the coastal mainland. 
 
4.5. Discussion & Conclusion  
To date, the climate change adaptation researchers mostly have endeavored to 
identify the barriers without addressing how they emerge as such. It is certainly 
interesting to recognize the challenges that impair the adaptation governance processes, 
but this does not identify the root of the problem. In order to address these barriers we 
need a better understanding on how these barriers emerge. The emergence of barriers 
involves different mechanisms operating between different or same levels (i.e. macro-
micro, micro-micro). In this study, we focused on the micro-micro or action-formation 
mechanisms as this focus allows us to understand how or why the belief, perception, and 
governance nature of the organizations cause the barriers to emerge in the governance 
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process. Our objective here was not to come up with new mechanisms but rather distill 
which mechanisms already identified in the conceptual literature best explain the barriers 
that have been observed in the adaptation governance process in Bangladesh. To that end, 
we identified barriers that appear in the interactions among organizations and analyzed 
the underlying action-formation mechanisms. We found that at least four mechanisms of 
those that have been discussed conceptually are involved in the emergence of barriers in 
Bangladesh: belief formation, power dynamics (enclosure/exclusion), power dynamics 
(boundary control), and organizational inertia.  
By combining qualitative primary data and observations reported in the empirical 
literature, our approach of analysis enables us to consider multiple cases of adaptation 
and provides a more comprehensive view of mechanisms. Biesbroek et al. (2017), 
Wellstead et al. (2018) encouraged to abandon the barrier-approach research and produce 
more evidence-based research on mechanism-based explanation of barriers in order to 
have a more general understanding on mechanisms. We argue that our approach of 
analysis can act as a bridge between traditional barrier studies and mechanism-based 
explanation of barriers. Instead of totally abandoning all studies that took a barrier 
approach to identify the barriers, our approach would filter out the studies that took a 
barrier approach but provided insights into mechanisms as well. Our analysis reveals that 
not all barrier studies are useful. In order to consider a traditional barrier research, we 
have to make sure that the research describes or analyzes the context, interactions, and 
causes. A mere list of barriers will not be helpful in our approach of analysis.  
Our mechanism-based analysis reveals that how organizations consciously or 
unintentionally interact with other organizations in a way that impair the governance 
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process. The mechanisms we identified are the output of situational or macro-micro 
mechanisms. Cultural practices or institutional norms often dictate the actions of the 
organizations. For instance, officials from the water development board individually 
acknowledged the significance of emergency management funding to us, yet collectively 
they did not take any action to establish the fund. The identification of the mechanism 
(i.e. organizational inertia) explains this lack of action: because of resource or routine 
rigidity. An upper level analysis of situational mechanisms would further reveal that why 
organizational inertia takes place, while a lower level analysis on transformational 
mechanisms would allow us to know how the inertia affect the interactions. In order to 
have a more complete diagnosis of how barriers are unfolding from macro level 
phenomenon to micro level impacts, we have to take all three mechanisms into account. 
While this study attempts to capture a part of the larger picture, future research can be 
directed to understand particularly situational mechanisms.   
The mechanism-based analysis provides insights on the adaptation governance in 
Bangladesh. The National Adaptation Plan of Action indicates that the government 
ensured participation of variety of actors in the plan formulation process. Also, through 
our interviews we found that local stakeholders were involved in the adaptation planning 
process. Despite these efforts, our mechanism-based analysis showed that the power 
dynamics (enclosure/exclusion) mechanism is active, and serves to exclude some 
vulnerable groups from the adaptation governance process. Similarly, we found that 
organizational inertia prohibits organizations from being adaptive to climate change 
impacts. In this way, the mechanism-based analysis helps in going beyond a description 
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of engagement and participation to reveal the more complicated social processes that 
impair the adaptation governance process.  
How does mechanism-based explanation help us to overcome or at least navigate 
through barriers that emerge in the interactions among actors? To answer this question, 
attention is required on how mechanisms are into influencing the governance process and 
how it shapes the actors‘ roles and activities. Note that the actors are not the center of our 
attention, but rather the mechanisms driving their actions. Once the roles of the actors, as 
influenced by mechanisms, in the emergence of barriers are understood, the decision 
makers would be in a better position to modulate the roles by addressing the mechanisms. 
These mechanisms can be addressed through continuous interactions or mutually 
changing the institutional rules or norms. For example, Dewulf & Bouwen (2012) found 
that creation of a coordinating space for mutual interactions and understanding each 
other‘s framings could work against triggering the power dynamics (enclosure & 
exclusion) mechanism. In most cases these mechanisms will exist to some extent but the 
objective should be to make these mechanisms dormant or diminish their influences so 
that they cannot trigger barriers. However, a complete eradication of one particular 
mechanism may require transformative changes (i.e. cultural shift, complete alteration of 
governance approach). For example, to remove organizational inertia once and for all, 
organizations need to be flexible, adaptive, and inclusive, requiring a fundamental change 
in the approach of organizational governance. Furthermore, addressing these mechanisms 
needs to be done carefully as short sighted interventions in one mechanism can trigger 
new mechanisms (Biesbroek et al. 2014). For instance, if the decision makers want to 
remove organizational inertia, they have to be cautious so that the same information has 
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been treated differently by different actors within the same organization. For this reason, 
a clear and critical understanding of all the involved mechanisms in the emergence of 
barriers to adaptation is essential. At the same time mapping out how these mechanisms 
are interrelated is critical as well.  
Overall, our research shows that mechanism-based explanation of barriers can provide 
novel insights by allowing us to understand why and how barriers emerge. Mechanism-
based thinking would enable the actors to address the barriers and navigate through them 
more effectively (Biesbroek et al. 2014, 2017, Wellstead et al. 2018). In this study, we 
attempted to provide an overall view of mechanisms by combining interview data with 
literature review data. However, our study is regionally contextualized in Bangladesh. 
We need more evidence from other regions on the mechanism of barriers to ensure more 
effective adaptation governance process. Understanding and addressing these 
mechanisms would enable to us to plan adaptation actions more effectively and 
efficiently.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation research sought to examine how understanding of multilevel 
organizations, their structure of governance network, and power dynamics among them 
influence the adaptation governance process in Bangladesh. This research found 
significant similarities in understanding of vulnerability among the organizations that are 
operating at different levels of governance. Similarity in understanding of the problem 
has the potential to increase the efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and legitimacy of 
climate adaptation (O‘Brien et al. 2004, Adger et al. 2005). However, similarity in 
understanding can also indicate narrow vision and limited understanding of the problem. 
Particularly, if the governance arrangement is elite-centered, representing a dominance of 
few actors in the governance processes, similarity in understanding of the problem may 
not result into the desired outcome. In the second chapter, I found that the adaptation 
governance in Bangladesh is elite-pluralistic in nature and despite containing top-down 
and bottom-up processes, a few actors at the national level of governance are observed 
dominant. Under this elite-pluralistic governance arrangement, similarity in 
understanding of the problem can actually indicate a narrow framing of the problem. This 
narrow framing can happen because the organizations with high influence can dictate the 
perception of understanding of other organizations. A narrow framing of understanding 
can prohibit appreciating other perspectives and can lead to resource misallocation and 
fragmented development (Pahl-Wostl 2009). This is evident through the comparative 
criteria weighting by the organizations in my analysis. Less focus on social and economic 
aspects can negate the significance of infrastructural solutions.   
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Climate change adaptation is a ‗part and parcel‘ of social and political processes 
(Eriksen et al. 2015). As such, the adaptation governance process is influenced by the 
existing cultural and historical processes. Similar to the administrative system in 
Bangladesh which is historically centralized and top-down in nature (Zafarullah 2016, 
Rahman & Tosun 2018), this research also found a relative centralization of power in 
adaptation governance. I further observed that representing the centralized nature of the 
governance, organizational cultures and perceptions are also top-down in approach. 
Under this approach, organizations attempt to push their understanding over 
hierarchically lower organizations. While doing so, they are not receptive to the 
understanding of the problem developed at lower levels of governance. At the same time, 
because of centralization of power, these organizations cannot facilitate local stakeholder 
participation enough. Such lack of participation and a failure in knowledge co-production 
can lead to unsustainable adaptation outcomes (Eriksen et al. 2011, Manuel-Navarette 
2013). However, whether centralization of power or top-down approach contributes to 
unsustainable outcomes is arguable. In case of Bangladesh, I found that a relative 
centralization of power may contribute to unsustainable adaptation outcome but in 
England, national government-driven top-down structure of adaptation governance 
mobilized actors at different levels without any significant duplicity or conflict in 
adaptation actions and thus facilitates better coordination (Tompkins et al. 2010). 
Similarly, in the Netherlands, relative centralization of power does not impair the 
adaptation success (Hegger & Dieperink 2014). This dual nature of governance 
demonstrates that the importance of context. As adaptation is influenced by social and 
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political processes, how history and culture shapes the organizational behavior and 
governance process are important in adaptation studies.  
It has been argued that addressing contextual vulnerability, ensuring local level 
participations, and understanding feedbacks between global and local processes are 
imperative for sustainable adaptation (Adger et al. 2009, Ribot 2010, Eriksen et al. 2011). 
However, I argue that only addressing these issues will not be enough in Bangladesh. The 
governance process in Bangladesh still retains the colonial mindset of administration in 
which the organizations conceive themselves superior than the local stakeholders. As 
such, even if local participation is ensured to some extent, because of this mindset local 
participation may remain ineffective. This is concerning because the power dynamics 
analysis of this study showed that local level needs assessment data are collected by 
frontier organizations and as frontier organizations hold such mindset, local requirements 
may remain unaddressed.     
To ensure effective adaptation outcomes in Bangladesh, we need coproduction of 
policies and processes but at the same time we need to focus on changing the elite 
perception of the organizations. Unless the superior tendencies of these organizations are 
addressed, ensuring participation will not be sufficient. Furthermore, to devolve power 
from the national level, the frontier organizations should be given more opportunities to 
exercise power so that they can manage emergency situations. Also, the supporting 
organizations should have the power to independently evaluate the adaptation progress 
and outcome. The capacities of these organizations need to be enhanced as well to wield 
the given power. My mechanism based analysis suggests that focus should be given on 
the underlying mechanisms that cause the emergence of the barriers.      
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Overall, this research advances our knowledge on the significance of multilevel 
governance network in climate change adaptation governance by examining how 
multilevel organizations understand or frame the problem, how their interactions and 
power dynamics affect the governance process, and how barriers emerge in their 
interactions. While this research contributes to enhancing our broad understanding on the 
structure and interactions of multilevel organizations, more research on this issue is 
urgently required. The efficiency and effectiveness of adaptation largely depends on how 
these organizations are structured and interact to manage climate adaptation actions. 
More particularly, research is needed to examine the interactions between government 
and non-government organizations, the two largest actors in adaptation governance. A 
potential research question could be: How do power dynamics influence the competition, 
contestation, and collaboration between government and non-government organizations? 
Further research is needed to examine how the attributes of the organizations influence 
the nature and type of interactions. This research used social network analysis to examine 
the collaboration and coordination networks and determine the influence of organizations 
over governance process, but future research can extend this approach by considering 
organizational attributes and resources as well. More research on the interactions among 
organizations will enhance our understanding on how the adaptation actions can be made 
more efficient and effective. 
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Sectoral (government) organizations involved in managing vulnerability to climate 
change management in coastal areas of Bangladesh. 
Sector Key Ministry Associated Organizations Leading 
Organization 
Key Actions 
Agriculture Ministry of 
Agriculture 
I. Department of 
Agricultural Extension 
II. Bangladesh 
Agricultural 
Development 
Corporation 
III. Bangladesh 
Agricultural Research 
Council 
IV. Bangladesh 
Agricultural Research 
Institute  
V. Bangladesh Rice 
Research Institute 
VI. Bangladesh Jute 
Research Institute 
VII. Bangladesh Institute of 
Nuclear Agriculture 
VIII. Agricultural 
Information Services 
IX. Seed Certification 
Agency 
X. Soil Resource 
Development Institute 
Department of 
Agricultural 
Extension 
(DAE) 
 
- Providing need based 
extension services to farmers. 
- Enabling farmers to optimize 
resources to promote 
sustainable agricultural 
practices and socio-economic 
growth. 
- Assisting the farmers to 
increase agricultural 
productivity and adopt new 
technology. 
Hydrology Ministry of 
Water Resources 
I. Bangladesh Water 
Development Board 
II. River Research 
Institute 
III. Directorate of 
Bangladesh Haor and 
Wetland Development 
IV. Water Resources 
Planning Organization 
Bangladesh 
Water 
Development 
Board (BWDB) 
 
- Development and 
management water resource 
projects through 
embankments, levees, and 
sluice gates.  
- Management and mitigation 
of river bank erosion. 
- Promoting food production 
through surface water 
irrigation. 
- Ensuring stakeholder 
participation in environment 
friendly development 
initiatives. 
Infrastructures Ministry of Local 
Government, 
Rural 
Development & 
Cooperatives 
I. Local Government 
Engineering 
Department 
II. City Corporations 
III. National Institute of 
Local Government 
IV. Department of Public 
Health Engineering 
 
Local 
Government 
Engineering 
Department 
(LGED) 
- Improving accessibility of 
rural growth centers. 
- Construction of 
embankments. 
- Construction of disaster 
shelters, tree plantation on 
embankments. 
- Urban infrastructure 
development. 
- Providing technical support to 
district, sub-district, and 
union administrations. 
Forestry Ministry of 
Environment,  
Forests, and 
Climate Change 
I. Bangladesh Forest 
Department 
II. Department of 
Environment 
III. Bangladesh Forest 
Research Institute 
IV. Bangladesh Forest 
Development 
Corporation 
Bangladesh 
Forest 
Department 
(FD) 
- Conservation and sustainable 
management of forest, 
wildlife, and biodiversity. 
- Increasing land stability and 
climate resiliency of 
ecosystem. 
- Expanding social forestry and 
ensuring stakeholder 
participation. 
- Increasing forest cover 
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through afforestation and 
reforestation. 
 
Socio-
economy 
Ministry of: 
Social Welfare, 
Disaster 
Management and 
Relief, Finance, 
Health & Family 
Welfare 
I. Local Non-
Government 
Organizations (NGOs) 
II. International NGOs  
III. Other relevant 
government 
organizations 
Local NGOs - Microfinance 
- Disaster management 
- Education provision 
- Community empowerment 
- Human rights and justice 
- Eliminating poverty 
- Health and nutrition 
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List of vulnerability indicators. The explanations, uses, and sources have been provided. 
Each indicator has further been identified as an indicator of exposure (E), sensitivity (S), 
and adaptive capacity (AC): the three components of vulnerability. 
Major Criteria Sub-Criteria Explanation & Use Source 
Social Literacy rate Percent of population aged 07 or over who can read and write. Higher 
literacy rate indicates higher ability to receive and process information 
and technology, and as such denotes lower vulnerability (Asfaw & 
Admassie 2004). AC 
Population 
Census (2011) 
Dependency 
ratio 
Ratio of population aged below 15 and over 65 to the population aged 
between 15 and 64. Higher dependency ratio indicates higher number of 
economically dependent member, less convenience in emergency 
evacuation dependent people, and as a result, higher vulnerability. S 
Population 
Census (2011) 
Population 
density 
Number of population per square kilometer. Higher population density 
represents higher economic activity, higher risk of population getting 
affected, and thus higher vulnerability. S 
Population 
Census (2011) 
Size of the 
household 
Average number of persons in a household. In Bangladesh, majority 
families are nuclear in nature with few earning members. As such, 
larger household size indicates more dependent people and higher 
chance of getting affected by disasters. S 
Population 
Census (2011) 
Number of 
health center 
Number of health centers per 100,000 populations. Health centers 
support hazard affected people during and after natural hazards. Higher 
number of health centers represents lower vulnerability. AC 
Population 
Census (2011), 
District 
Statistics 
(2011), 
Directorate 
General of 
Health Services 
(http://www.dg
hs.gov.bd)  
Sanitation Percent of population with sanitation facility. Absence of sanitation 
facility induces more vulnerability through spread of diseases in the 
hazard affected areas (WHO 2015). S 
Population 
Census (2011) 
Economic Poverty rate Poverty headcount ratio in percent or percent of population with an 
earning less than $1.90 a day. Higher poverty causes higher 
vulnerability. S 
Bangladesh 
Poverty Map 
(2010) 
Natural 
resource 
dependent 
population 
Percent of population depend on agriculture and related activities. The 
agricultural sector is highly prone to natural hazards, and thus, higher 
ratio of natural resource dependent population in a system indicates 
higher vulnerability (Ahsan & Warner 2014). S 
Agricultural 
Census (2008) 
Marginal land 
holders  
Percent of farm holdings with ≤1.5 acres of cultivated land. Note, farm 
holding is defined as an agricultural production unit that has at least 
0.05 acres cultivated lands. Marginal land holders are particularly 
vulnerable due to their minimum resources and lack of economic 
capacities. S 
Agricultural 
Census (2008) 
Percent of 
agricultural 
holdings took 
loan 
Percent of farm holdings took loan from banks or other institutions. In 
the rural areas of Bangladesh, the agricultural loans are often short term 
with high interest rate. At time of hazard and in the absence of any crop 
insurance, loans often become liabilities for these farm holdings and 
Agricultural 
Census (2008) 
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makes the holdings more vulnerable (Gerlitz et al. 2017). S 
Agricultural Cropping 
intensity 
Percentage of temporary gross crop area in comparison with temporary 
net crop area. Higher cropping intensity represents more frequent 
production of crop varieties, and a system with higher cropping 
intensity is less vulnerable. AC 
Agricultural 
Census (2008) 
Irrigation 
facility 
Percent of net cultivated area under irrigation facility. Irrigation facility 
can reduce vulnerability substantially by providing freshwater during 
dry season and by washing out the salt layer formed on land after major 
floods. AC 
Agricultural 
Census (2008) 
Cattles Percent of farm holdings reporting cattle. Holdings with cattle are less 
vulnerable than other farm holdings with no cattle as people can sell or 
live off cattle during disasters. S 
Agricultural 
Census (2008) 
Farming 
equipment 
Number of agricultural equipment per farm holding. In Bangladesh, 
higher number of farming equipment denotes lower vulnerability as 
farmers with equipment can do more production as well as can use them 
as asset to recover from disaster damage more quickly. AC 
Agricultural 
Census (2008) 
Net cultivated 
area 
Percent of net cultivated area in total area. Net cultivated area is defined 
as land area that is cropped in any given time in a census year. This 
includes land areas under permanent crops, temporary crops, and 
current fallow. As the economy of this area is largely agriculture 
dominated, higher net cultivated area represents less vulnerability. 
However, higher net cultivated area can produce high vulnerability 
through exposure, but it also provides higher agricultural outputs and 
assist affected people to recover fast. S 
Agricultural 
Census (2008) 
Land use Forested area Percent of land area under forest area. This forest area includes reserve 
forest and social forestry. Reserve forests can protect people from tidal 
floods and cyclonic storms, while the social forests can act as shield 
during cyclonic events. As such, higher forested area represents less 
vulnerability. S 
In this analysis, Landsat 8 OLI surface reflectance level-2 (image date: 
01/17/2017) data product has been used. Unsupervised classification 
using ISODATA algorithm has been conducted.  
USGS 
(https://earthex
plorer.usgs.gov/
) 
 
Area under 
fruit crop 
Percent of land area under fruit crop. Fruit crops are mostly tall and 
strong trees and less affected by flood or cyclone hazards. S 
Agricultural 
Census (2008) 
Area under 
Doash (fertile) 
soil 
Percent of land area under Doash soil. Larger area indicates potentially 
highly productive areas. Higher production leads to lower vulnerability. 
Economic loss during disaster might be higher; however, the potential 
to compensate the damage after disaster will also be higher. S 
District 
Statistics 
(2011) (District 
Statistics report 
contains sub-
district level 
data) 
Area under 
saline soil 
Percent of land area under saline soil (more than 8.0 dS/m). Larger 
saline area represents low productivity and less arable land. Increase of 
saline area will increase vulnerability of an area. S 
Soil Resources 
Development 
Institute (2010) 
Natural Elevation Elevation for each study unit has obtained from ASTER Global Digital 
Elevation Model at 30m spatial resolution. Higher elevation indicates 
lower vulnerability. E 
USGS 
(https://earthex
plorer.usgs.gov/
) 
Tree cover Tree cover includes forests as well as homestead trees. Trees can protect 
people and their houses during cyclones by reducing the wind speed. 
Also, people can sell matured trees during the times of emergencies. So, 
higher tree cover represents lower vulnerability. E 
Tree cover data was obtained from the Percent Tree Cover (PTC) 250m 
image layer in the MODIS Vegetation Continuous Fields product 
(MOD44B, v006).  
LP DAAC 
(https://lpdaac.u
sgs.gov/)  
  152 
Distance from 
the sea/river 
The distance from major river or the Bay of Bengal. Closer distance 
indicates higher vulnerability. E 
Google Earth, 
ArcGIS Base 
Map 
Infrastructu--ral Flood/cyclone 
shelter 
Number of flood and cyclone shelters per 100,000 people. The 
government and the international development agencies establish multi-
purpose shelters which can serve both as primary schools and shelters. 
Higher number of shelters ensures less vulnerability. AC 
District 
Statistics 
(2011) 
High schools 
and colleges 
Number of high schools and colleges per 100,000 people. High schools 
and colleges predominantly serve two purposes: education and shelter 
house during disasters. AC 
District 
Statistics 
(2011) 
Household 
structural 
characteristi--cs 
Non-brick 
built 
household 
Percent of non-brick built households. This includes semi-built, mud 
houses, and shabby houses. Higher number of non-brick built houses 
represents higher vulnerability to flood and cyclone hazards. S 
Population 
Census (2011) 
Households 
with no 
electricity 
Percent of households with no electricity. Lack of electricity connection 
deters the dissemination of warning message and evacuation endeavors. 
AC 
Population 
Census (2011) 
Unsafe 
drinking water 
source 
Percent of households with unsafe drinking water source, such as river 
water, pond water. Despite water purification approaches, unsafe 
drinking water source can cause severe health issues at the time of 
hazards (WHO & UNICEF 2017). S 
Population 
Census (2011) 
  153 
APPENDIX C 
RESULTS OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  154 
Results of social network analysis for each organization. 
Organization 
Name 
Level of 
Governance 
Degree 
Centrality 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
Core/ 
Periphery 
Influence 
over 
Governance 
Brokerage 
Role 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
National 20 229.980 0.227 Core High 
Representative
/ Coordinator/ 
Gatekeeper 
Ministry of 
Planning 
National 22 129.761 0.353 Core High 
Itinerant/ 
Representative
/ Gatekeeper 
Ministry of 
Finance 
(Economic 
Relations 
Division) 
National 22 129.761 0.354 Core High Itinerant/ 
Gatekeeper/ 
Liaison 
Ministry of 
Water 
Resources 
National 15 109.366 0.201 Core High Itinerant 
Donor Agency National 21 147.584 0.209 Core High Representative 
LGED-N National 16 155.061 0.260 Core High Representative 
BWDB-N 
National 18 158.236 0.220 Core High 
Itinerant/ 
Liaison 
DAE-N National 19 184.914 0.234 Core High 
Itinerant/ 
Representative
/ Gatekeeper/ 
Liaison 
BADC-N National 15 82.752 0.245 Core High Liaison 
CEGIS 
National 17 152.781 0.257 Core High 
Itinerant/ 
Liaison 
Ministry of 
Social Welfare 
National 9 10.133 0.138 Periphery Medium N/A 
INGO National 7 6.014 0.100 Periphery Medium N/A 
WARPO National 6 3.410 0.074 Periphery Medium N/A 
RRI National 6 1.452 0.074 Periphery Medium N/A 
Ministry of 
Environment 
& Forest 
National 9 4.736 0.122 Periphery Medium N/A 
Ministry of 
Local 
Government 
National 7 0 0.142 Periphery Medium N/A 
BRRI National 6 29.834 0.103 Periphery Medium N/A 
BARC National 8 41.043 0.141 Periphery Medium N/A 
IWM National 6 1.577 0.100 Periphery Medium N/A 
BINA National 8 21.342 0.153 Periphery Medium N/A 
NGO-N National 10 58.680 0.133 Periphery Medium N/A 
FD-N National 12 68.123 0.127 Periphery Medium N/A 
LGED-D District 11 71.515 0.060 Periphery Medium Liaison 
BWDB-D District 12 78.941 0.062 Periphery Medium Liaison 
BADC-D District 5 6.860 0.058 Periphery Medium N/A 
District 
Administration 
District 12 41.515 0.034 Periphery Medium N/A 
FD-D District 9 25.600 0.042 Periphery Medium N/A 
DAE-D District 11 81.253 0.051 Periphery Medium N/A 
DAE-SD Sub-district 7 28.204 0.014 Periphery Medium N/A 
Sub-district 
Administration 
Sub-district 10 28.867 0.015 Periphery Medium N/A 
NGO-L Sub-district 8 41.591 0.029 Periphery Medium N/A 
SRDI National 4 2.930 0.067 Periphery Low N/A 
BARI National 5 0 0.075 Periphery Low N/A 
SCA National 4 1.200 0.074 Periphery Low N/A 
DOE National 4 1.095 0.084 Periphery Low N/A 
LGED-SD Sub-district 5 9.935 0.011 Periphery Low N/A 
BWDB-SD Sub-district 5 12.029 0.011 Periphery Low N/A 
FD-SD Sub-district 3 0 0 Periphery Low N/A 
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Search key words for mechanism-based analysis (as of January 2019) 
Platform Search key words Article found 
Web of Science TS = (climate change OR *adapt* OR climat* adapt*) AND TS = 
(challenge* OR barrier* OR obstacl* OR constrain*) AND TS = 
(Bangladesh) 
269 
Web of Science TS = (natural dis* OR disaster* OR disaster manage* OR disaster risk 
reduction) AND TS = (challenge* OR barrier* OR obstacl* OR constrain*) 
AND TS = (Bangladesh) 
122 
Web of Science TS = (disaster vulnerability OR vulnerab* OR resilien*) AND TS = 
(challenge* OR barrier* OR obstacl* OR constrain*) AND TS = 
(Bangladesh) 
199 
Web of Science TS = (govern* OR bureaucra* OR institution*) AND TS = (climate change 
OR climate adaptation) AND TS = (challenge* OR barrier* OR obstacl* OR 
constrain*) AND TS = (Bangladesh) 
62 
Web of Science TS = (climate change OR *adapt* OR climat* adapt*) AND TI = 
(challenge* OR barrier* OR obstacl* OR constrain*) AND TS = 
(Bangladesh) 
28 
Web of Science TS = (govern* OR bureaucra* OR institution*) AND TS = (climate) AND 
TI = (challenge* OR barrier* OR obstacl* OR constrain*) AND TS = 
(Bangladesh) 
10 
Total 690 
Duplicates 266 
Total articles for screening 424 
 
